Remaking Alliances for the War on Terrorism

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ABSTRACT This essay contends that allies are vital for counterterrorism, but what we ask of them and their institutional form is quite different from what was asked of traditional alliance partners during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Despite these differences, some of the alliance dilemmas that plagued the United States in the past are likely to remain, though they will have different manifestations relevant to the war on terrorism. This essay concludes by arguing that, for purposes of the war on terrorism, the list of key allies has shifted and offers recommendations for improving US alliances.

KEY WORDS: Terrorism, alliances, counterterrorism

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks shook America. Eliot Cohen, one of the most sober analysts of security today, declared shortly afterwards that the ensuing struggle constituted ‘World War IV’ (the Cold War being World War III) and called for dramatic changes in US foreign policy.\(^1\) Several years later, the perception that this bloody day transformed the world remains widespread. But World War IV has not resulted in changes comparable to those that occurred during World War II and the Cold War. Although the United States has used September 11 to justify important decisions in its foreign policy, most notably the invasion of Iraq, its alliance structure has not changed to meet the threat of terrorist groups.\(^2\)

This neglect is unconscionable, as alliances are a vital part of the war on terrorism. As the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the ‘9/11 Commission’) argues, ‘Practically every aspect of US counterterrorism strategy relies on international cooperation.’ Bombing Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan, working with Thailand to capture local Al Qaeda members, or pressing the United Arab Emirates to halt its citizens’ financial support for jihadists all require assistance from allied governments. Having the wrong allies may prove devastating. At the very least, the United States may lavish money and offer policy concessions unnecessarily to the undeserving. At worst, neglect of a key regime could lead entire states or regions to fall prey to instability or even a takeover by jihadists.

The 9/11 attacks opened up new opportunities for alliances, but so far the United States has moved slowly to seize them. The United States has improved counterterrorism cooperation with former adversaries such as Russia and Syria and strengthened relations with a host of previously neglected countries such as Djibouti and Uzbekistan. Yet already, many countries of the world are skeptical of several US efforts linked to the war on terrorism. Several European states, for example, have complained about the detention of their nationals without trial at


4In a speech at Georgetown University on 18 Jan. 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called for ‘transformational diplomacy’ and restructuring the State Department to focus less on old concerns and more on countries relevant to counterterrorism as well as other emerging issues. See ‘Transformational Diplomacy’ available at <www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm>.

facilities in Guantanamo. As terrorism expert Paul Pillar contends, ‘Global cooperation against terrorism is already fragile.’

This essay seeks to answer several basic, but vital, questions: What role should US allies play in the war on terrorism? How has the role of allies changed since the pre-9/11 period? What criteria should be used to prioritize allies with regard to terrorism? What dilemmas are we likely to face? Who are our “new” allies, and which old allies are less important? What types of alliances should we have for these new allies? And what policy and institutional change are necessary to improve cooperation with our allies, both old and new?

International relations scholarship offers insights into these questions, but they must be modified to suit both the current geopolitical situation and the particulars of counterterrorism. The vast majority of scholarship focuses on questions of how states do choose allies (do they ‘bandwagon’ or ‘balance’) with far less attention on how they should choose their partners. Those works that do address the normative and policy question are usually tied explicitly to the Cold War or to its immediate aftermath, neglecting post-9/11 concerns. In addition, most of the work on alliances is focused on European history, though increasingly scholarship has incorporated Asia as well. Much of the effort against terrorism, however, involves allies in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and other parts of the developing world. Moreover, most of the work on alliances assumes a multipolar or bipolar world, not a unipolar one. Finally, much of the theoretical focus is on alliances linked to conventional military conflict. The threat environment they posit is largely one of potential or actual interstate war, not non-state or internal conflicts such as terrorism. Many of the concepts that this

7It is important to note several questions this essay deliberately does not address. Most important, this essay focuses on the role of alliances and terrorism and does not try to answer the question ‘what should the overall US alliance structure be?’ Terrorism is only one of many US interests. Sorting out the relative priority of counterterrorism versus other concerns such as China, Russia, proliferation, and so on is a massive undertaking in its own right. This essay hopes to contribute to the discussion by laying out the distinct demands of the war on terrorism, a first step toward the broader undertaking of designing an alliance structure that reflects many of the competing demands on the United States.
9Walt, for example, examines the question of how states in general response to threats and draws general conclusions. Snyder’s work focuses on a multipolar and anarchic
scholarship introduces remain useful, but they must be reapplied to a new set of challenges.  

In this essay, I make several arguments, around which the remainder of this essay is structured. First, I contend that allies are vital for counterterrorism, but what we ask of them is quite different from what was asked of traditional alliance partners during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. As a result, we need new criteria to identify our allies based on these needs. Key criteria include being able to provide intelligence on Al Qaeda, having strong counterinsurgency capabilities, enjoying influence with potential state sponsors of terrorism, having the capacity to aid weak states, and exerting influence in the Muslim world. Countries that currently have restive Muslim populations are particularly important. In addition, countries that were strong allies before 9/11 deserve extra consideration as much of the legwork for establishing an alliance has already been done.

Second, the type of alliances needed differs considerably from the Cold War era. Some types of cooperation such as fixing weak states are better done on a multilateral basis with strong institutions, but most cooperation will be on a bilateral or limited regional basis. In addition, much of this cooperation will not have remotely the degree of system and is concentrated on the clash of conventional arms. Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 129; Snyder’s article ‘The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics’ is also focused on a multipolar world. Dan Reiter defines an alliance as involving a ‘commitment to contribute military assistance’, a focus that is less useful for the effort against terrorism. Reiter, *Crucible of Beliefs*, 58. Walt and Posen note that alliance building often involves military assets of various sorts (Walt, *Origins of Alliances*, 149; Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984), 62. Patricia Weitsman also stresses the military element of alliances in her definition. Patricia A. Weitsman, ‘Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances’, *Security Studies* 7/1 (Autumn 1997), 158, footnote 3. For valuable work on Asia that offsets much of the traditional focus on Europe, see David Kang, ‘Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations,’ *International Security* 28/3 (Winter 2003/2004), 165–80 and Jennifer Lind, ‘Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy’, *International Security* 29/1 (Summer 2004), 92–121. It is worth noting that perhaps the most important work on alliances, Walt’s *Origins of Alliances*, draws primarily on patterns in the Middle East for its conclusions.

institutionalization that characterized alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the Cold War.

Third, I argue that some of the alliance dilemmas that plagued the United States in the Cold War and its aftermath are likely to remain, though they will have different manifestations relevant to the war on terrorism. Problems such as buck-passing and chain-gang will remain though their forms have changed. In addition, as with past alliances, differences in threat perceptions and interests will pose problems. A particular challenge for the United States today is that efforts to strengthen local regimes’ counterterrorism capacities may inhibit chances of democratic reform. Washington must also recognize that allies may lose legitimacy if they work with the United States, a loss that may bolster terrorists. Similarly, US cooperation with allies involved in their own struggles with Islamist groups will incur the opprobrium associated with their unpopular measures, such as Israel’s activities in Palestine and Russia’s repression in Chechnya.

I conclude this essay by arguing that, for purposes of the war on terrorism, the list of key allies has shifted. Britain, Canada, Egypt, France, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey remain the important allies they were during the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War eras, while China, Japan, and South Korea all matter less than before when the US focus is on Al Qaeda. Several countries also are on the list that were not important before 9/11: Afghanistan, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen. The most important new partners are India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, all of which are at the center of the struggle against terrorism.

I also offer recommendations for improving US alliances against terrorism. To improve its ability to create, maintain, and work with new allies, the United States must spend far more on diplomacy and make clear that it will not offer kneejerk support to all governments that try to justify their struggle with local rebels in the name of counterterrorism. In addition, the United States must devote attention to improving intelligence sharing with allies, penetrating allied intelligence services, restructuring the US military to focus more on helping allied counterinsurgency efforts, and reviving programs to improve the security services of other countries.

This essay first defines the wide spectrum of possible alliances and describes the overall US strategy against Al Qaeda as a prelude to the broader discussion of the role of allies in this struggle. In section two, it then identifies key areas of the strategy to which allies can contribute. Section three assesses several dilemmas that are likely when working with allies in the war on terrorism. Section four applies these criteria to select countries around the world, and identifies which countries are more and which are less important in the war
against terrorism. I conclude by describing the types of alliances needed for counterterrorism and offering recommendations for improving US cooperation with both new and old allies for purposes of counterterrorism.

**Background: Alliance Definitions and an Overview of the US Strategy**

Assessing the proper role of allies in counterterrorism requires understanding two nebulous and confused topics. The first is definitional: what is an alliance? The second involves clarifying a confused and confusing US policy.

*The Many Meanings of ‘Alliance’*

Alliance is a word used to mean many things, from limited cooperation to an institutionalized, NATO-like structure. Stephen Walt, a leading scholar of alliances, defines them broadly: ‘a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more states’.11 Other scholars employ terms like coalitions, alignments, and balancing to describe variations on this broad theme. For my purposes, it is necessary to delve more deeply into distinctions among alliance types, as counterterrorism often requires alliances that are structured and institutionalized in a manner different from NATO and other Cold War alliances.12

Historically, the power of an alliance required going beyond aggregating the power of its individual members: their level of commitment, and their willingness to subordinate national concerns to those of their allies, are also vital. Most states find alliance power less efficient, and certainly less reliable, than internal strength because of uncertainties over whether their partners will act when the chips they are down. Even if they do, coordination difficulties diminish potential synergies for using force or political power.13 However, more integrated and institutionalized alliances can usually more efficiently draw on the power of their members because they share common bureaucracies, military doctrines, system interoperability, and other shared procedures. Traditionally, the tradeoff for integration was less national control – both political and military – over alliance action and

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12A useful typology can be found in Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 6–16.
a greater cost to ensure integration via interoperability of forces, joint training, and so on.\textsuperscript{14}

Alliances can be loosely conceptualized as points on a spectrum, ranging from one-time, ad hoc cooperation on one end to an integrated military structure on the other.\textsuperscript{15} Different variables that affect the value of an alliance include the extent and cost (both financial and in potential lives lost) of assistance proffered, the length of time the cooperation is expected to be in place, the level of integration and coordination during the cooperation, and the overall degree of institutionalization.

Figure 1 presents this notionally, portraying the power of an alliance through both its depth (level of integration) and its breadth (the commonality of the members’ strategic goals). NATO represents the acme of alliance integration. Its members worked not only to counter the Soviet Union, but also to manage other issues, such as intervention in the Balkans. During World War II, both the United States and the Soviet Union had an overwhelming interest in working together against Nazi Germany, but institutionalization was extremely limited. The United States and Iran also cooperated in a loose way during the US-led campaign in Afghanistan, with Tehran agreeing to rescue downed American pilots on its territory, but the degree of shared interest was far less than the US-Soviet effort against Germany. Washington and the Iranian regime retained vast differences, and the extent of cooperation was extremely limited in scope and duration. In contrast, the United States and Britain work closely on a range of issues far beyond their shared agenda in NATO, and some cooperation (such as intelligence sharing) is institutionalized. Finally – and outside what is traditionally seen as an “alliance” – are international organizations like the Universal Postal Union (UPU), which have an extremely broad membership and high degree of institutionalization but are focused only on an extremely narrow issue.\textsuperscript{16}

Alliance integration depended heavily on three things: common interests, common values, and the utility of integrated military cooperation. Shared threat, of course, leads states to work closely together and was the most important variable in producing alliances and making them tight.\textsuperscript{17} The Soviet threat, for example, unified

\textsuperscript{14}Snyder, \textit{Alliance Politics}, 44.

\textsuperscript{15}This excludes neutrality on the low end of the spectrum and international organization with near-universal membership on the other. Much of my thinking on the subject of alliance tightness and the resulting power came from an unpublished work by Derek Eaton during his time at the RAND Corporation.

\textsuperscript{16}See <www.upu.int/> for more details.

\textsuperscript{17}Walt, \textit{Origins of Alliances}, 263–66.
members of NATO. Threat is not the only factor that affects alliance tightness. Though democracy was not criteria for membership, most NATO countries were Western democracies with a shared cultural heritage.

During the Cold War, alliance planners focused on the more integrated end of the spectrum because the nature of the threat—conventional Soviet military power—was best countered by an integrated force. Effective military power depended heavily on proper command, integration of forces, and other means of drawing synergies from armies of various Western countries. A large multilateral structure was ideal, as more members meant more potential power. In addition, preventing a gap in the potential front required cooperation from all at risk.

Ad hoc cooperation was discouraged. France’s decision to pull out of NATO, for example, was viewed as a crisis even though Paris remained part of the Western alliance more broadly. Other aspects of the response to the threat that were less concerned with conventional conflict, such as the development of a nuclear program or anti-Soviet political intelligence, were not done at a NATO level.

The remainder of this essay looks at alliances, focusing on activities that involve regular, rather than ad hoc, cooperation. This cooperation may or may not be institutionalized, which has mixed advantages for
counterterrorism. In the final section, I spell out the degree of institutionalization needed for several important aspects of counterterrorism and how multilateral the structures need to be.

What is the US Strategy for Fighting Terrorism?

The proper role of allies can only be understood in the context of the overall US strategy for fighting Al Qaeda and its affiliates. The US strategy, however, is both shifting and vague. Drawing on various US government policy documents, the speeches of US leaders, and the actions of the federal government (and where the United States has not matched its action with rhetoric), I have identified what I believe are the key components and characteristics of US strategy, prioritized according to my judgment as to their relative weight. However, the plethora of documents and statements suggests at best a degree of policy confusion, and at worst a lack of a coherent strategy.

18 Neutrality or ‘non-action’ (such as not providing terrorists with weapons of mass destruction) is not explicitly addressed.

19 Stopping the financing of terrorism is excluded, though many would include it as a top US priority as reducing Al Qaeda and other terrorists’ assets inhibits the effectiveness of their organization. However, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States contends that while combating terrorist financing is often declared to be effective, ‘In reality, completing choking off the money to Al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups has been essentially impossible.’ John Roth, Douglas Greenburg, and Serena Wille, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report to the Commission (Washington DC: 2004), 2. Many of the easiest ways to disrupt financing were used successfully after 9/11, but today much of the financing is done through illicit channels or through other means that are hard to halt. The monograph goes on to note, however, that tracking financing is a vital way of gaining intelligence on terrorists – thus, on balance, I consider stopping financing as part of the intelligence effort though it can be legitimately viewed as a category in its own right.

20 Almost every reader will quarrel over the specifics of this list of strategy components, the prioritization of the goals, and whether vital changes are necessary. Perhaps the most direct document is the White House’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which calls for the United States to work with allies to ‘defeat’ terrorist organizations of global reach; to ‘deny’ further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists; to ‘diminish’ the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and to ‘defend’ the United States’ through better homeland security. The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Feb. 2003), 11–12. Italics and bold in the original.

21 The US Government Accountability Office found that the United States has issued many strategy documents since 9/11 that address issues from aviation security to the proper role of military forces. The documents, however, often disagree or at times contain important gaps. See Statement of Norman Rabkin, ‘Homeland
First, the United States seeks to destroy terrorist organizations, particularly those of global reach. Such destruction may come from direct military strikes on terrorist cells and infrastructure. More commonly it involves the use of intelligence and law enforcement services to arrest, hound, and disrupt terrorists, making it hard for them to recruit, organize, proselytize, and plan as well as to conduct attacks.22

Second, the United States opposes states that sponsor terrorists or offer them sanctuary. Washington presses for zero tolerance of terrorism, pushing all states to work together to deny terrorists financing and a place to recruit, to say nothing of open sponsorship. Uncooperative regimes, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, will be coerced, or if necessary toppled.23 Washington also presses countries to improve their internal security to prevent Al Qaeda from operating below the radar screen, as happened in Germany before 9/11. As appropriate, the United States will also try to improve the capacity of weak states that might fall host to terrorists despite the regime’s best efforts to suppress them. Many experts have expressed concerns that Al Qaeda and its affiliates might take refuge and grow in lawless zones in Asia and Africa.24

Third, although US leaders consistently speak of a war on terrorism, in practice this effort has (appropriately) focused on Al Qaeda and its affiliates. As the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States contends, ‘But the enemy is not just “terrorism”, some generic evil. This vagueness blurs the strategy. The catastrophic threat at this moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by Islamist terrorism – especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology.’25 Even after 9/11, the United States has not significantly changed its policies regarding Hizballah, Hamas, the Liberation Tigers


25National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 362. Italics in the original. Academic experts share this criticism. As Stephen Van Evera has argued, ‘Defining it as a broad war on terror was a tremendous mistake. It should have been a war on Al Qaeda. Don’t take your eye off the ball.’ As quoted in Nicholas Lehmann, ‘The War on What?’ The New Yorker, 16 Sept. 2002.
of Tamil Eelam, the Fuerrzas Armadas Revolucionaries de Colombia (FARC), or other leading terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{26}

Fourth, much of the effort in the war on terrorism is linked to efforts against large Islamist insurgent movements, which employ guerrilla warfare, as well as terrorist cells. Al Qaeda nurtured and championed insurgencies in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Algeria, Egypt, the Philippines, and Uzbekistan, among other countries.\textsuperscript{27} Insurgencies provide Al Qaeda with a pool of manpower, local reach, and logistics capabilities. In addition, these regional causes often inspire local recruits, who are then more open to Al Qaeda’s broader message. Indeed, historically Al Qaeda has devoted far more of its money and manpower to bolstering insurgencies than conducting terrorist operations.\textsuperscript{28} Insurgents, for their part, get much needed funding and manpower if they can link their cause to the broader Islamist jihad that Al Qaeda champions. Much of the global war on terrorism is a focused effort against Islamist insurgencies.

For Al Qaeda, insurgencies are vital for several reasons. First, they are a means of taking control of a state, a long-standing goal of Islamist movements.\textsuperscript{29} Second, they are an important means of bolstering the appeal of the overall cause. By playing up local grievances that have widespread appeal (e.g. Russian oppression of Chechens or the Israeli occupation of Palestine), Al Qaeda adds luster to its own cause by association. Third, insurgencies act as incubators for the organization’s membership, forging tight bonds through warfare and allowing Al Qaeda to weed out potential recruits that might not be highly committed. For all these reasons, stopping Al Qaeda requires action against its insurgent affiliates.

In rhetoric, the United States has also called for shaping the global environment to hinder the spread of terrorism. The White House’s \textit{National Strategy for Combating Terrorism} calls for diminishing the deprivation, political disputes, and other core problems terrorists may

\textsuperscript{26}In almost all these cases, the United States was ‘opposed’ to the group and cooperating with the governments opposing the groups to varying degrees. Since 9/11, US condemnations of Israeli, Russian, or other government mistakes have diminished, but this is only a shift in degree.

\textsuperscript{27}For a review, see Anonymous, \textit{Through Our Enemies’ Eyes} (Washington DC: Brassey’s 2002), pp.138–41 and 197–205. Almost all insurgent movements use terrorism as well as guerrilla warfare. In my judgment, a pure terrorist group is one that does not use guerrilla warfare, but many groups – including some of the most troubling terrorist groups like the Lebanese Hizballah or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam – use both.

\textsuperscript{28}National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, \textit{Monograph on Terrorist Financing}, 4.

exploit. President Bush and other leaders have called for bringing democracy to the Middle East as a means of influencing support for terrorism. On a humbler scale, there is universal agreement that better public diplomacy is necessary to reach out and shape Muslim opinion. These broad calls to address root causes have not received the same level of attention as the above goals. So far, several obvious disputes linked to terrorism, such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the Indo-Pakistan fight for Kashmir, have received relatively little attention despite many claims that they breed terrorism and lead to the formation of broader networks. Moreover, the United States has devoted little money toward or on diminishing the ‘root causes’ of terrorism or on improving homeland defense. It is unclear, however, what the root causes of terrorism linked to Al Qaeda are (something that should be a priority for scholars). On homeland defense, however, much is missing. Public diplomacy and efforts to democratize the Middle East (outside Iraq) remain neglected and underfunded. In October 2003, a government advisory group chaired by former Ambassador Edward P. Djerejian found that US public diplomacy ‘has become outmoded, lacking both strategic direction and resources’.

The Role of Allies in Counterterrorism

In both theory and practice, allies are vital to all four components of US strategy. Allied contributions derived from this strategy include: 1. providing intelligence and disrupting terrorists through aggressive law enforcement; 2. conducting counterinsurgency operations; 3. augmenting pressure on state sponsors and strengthening weak or failed states; and 4. adding legitimacy.

Intelligence Cooperation and Law Enforcement Disruption

Perhaps the most important role for allies is providing intelligence. As Paul Pillar argues:

The basic problem that terrorism poses for intelligence is as simple as it is chilling. A group of conspirators conceives a plot. Only the

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few conspirators know of their intentions, although they might get help from others. They mention nothing about their plot to anyone they cannot absolutely trust. They communicate nothing about their plans in a form that can be intercepted... They live and move normally and inconspicuously, and any preparations that cannot be done behind closed doors they do as part of those movements. The problem: How do we learn of the plot?  

Moreover, as Pillar contends, 'The target for intelligence is not just proven terrorists; it is anyone who might commit terrorism in the future.'

Al Qaeda's global nature poses an additional intelligence challenge, requiring that the United States track its activities in literally dozens of countries in the Middle East, Europe, South Asia, Africa, and Southeast Asia. It is possible that the United States might have strong independent intelligence capabilities in several of these countries, but it is highly unlikely that America will be strong everywhere. In particular, Washington is likely to need assistance in areas that were not traditional intelligence priorities, such as Africa and Southeast Asia.

Even if the US has unilateral assets in the country, allies usually do a better job collecting intelligence on a local level, particularly if human intelligence is necessary. Language skills, cultural knowledge, the ability to use local laws to your advantage, tapping into police manpower to augment surveillance, and the capacity to put pressure on or to induce families against suspects are all advantages for local officials.

Allies may also have superior interrogation skills due to their knowledge of the culture, ability to press family members, and their willingness to use coercion. Allies are more likely to have trained personnel who speak the particular dialects of suspected terrorists. In addition, they can use their access to suspects' families to increase pressure for cooperation. Moreover, according to a Washington Post article by Dana Priest, the United States has made renditions a key

32Pillar, 'Intelligence', 115.
33Ibid., author's italics.
34Posen, 'The Struggle against Terrorism', 43; Jennifer Sims, 'Foreign Intelligence Liaison – Devils, Deals, and Details', (forthcoming). Allies, however, may exaggerate Al Qaeda’s links to local groups, leading to skewed US assessments of the danger if there is no information to vet the liaison information. For example, the United States may have exaggerated Al Qaeda’s links to al-Ittihaad al-Islamiyya in Somalia due to information fed to Washington by the Ethiopian government. ‘Somalia’, The Economist Intelligence Unit: Country Profile 2004, (London: Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd. 2004) available at <http://www.eui.com>.
part of counterterrorism, sending suspects for interrogation in Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia among other locations.35 As one US official declared, ‘We don’t kick the shit out of them. We send them to other countries so they can kick the shit out of them.’36

The list of states that have strong intelligence capabilities on Al Qaeda and its affiliates correlates with the states that suffer a problem from Islamist unrest. Such a correlation is no coincidence: in order to stay in power, these regimes by necessity have had to develop knowledge against this adversary. Al Qaeda opposes many of the world’s most powerful regimes and is extremely hostile to several in the Muslim world, particularly Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Pakistan, and Algeria have all faced serious Islamist insurgencies or Islamist-linked terrorism in the past decade. Not surprisingly, the security services of all these states have a considerable knowledge of local Islamists as well as Al Qaeda.37 Former (or current) supporters of jihadist organizations such as Sudan and Pakistan are particularly valuable allies. If they work with the United States, the price is often abandoning the radicals, or at least angering them by working both sides of the street. In addition, they come with considerable intelligence on their former friends.

Several countries outside the Middle East have a significant global intelligence presence that can help against terrorism. Israel, France, and Britain all stand out as having a strong intelligence presence with regard to Islamist organizations and networks.38

Intelligence and law enforcement go hand in hand. If terrorists can be located, arresting them may lead to a conviction and take them off the streets. Arresting a terrorist is usually better than killing him, as a successful interrogation can lead the location of other terrorists or additional knowledge of the organization. An arrest for even a minor offense may generate valuable intelligence that is shared with the United States. According to a Washington Post article by Bob

Woodward, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) regularly works with dozens of countries around the world to detail suspected terrorists. 39

Waging Counterinsurgency

Just as they are vital for intelligence gathering, so too are allies necessary for successful counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency is waged best through highly effective intelligence, so the same benefits that apply with regard to intelligence gathering also apply to counterinsurgency: it is often allies that will have superior local knowledge of the adversary, the region’s population, the terrain, and so on that will make success more likely. 40 In addition, local governments are likely to have a larger stomach for the fight than would the United States because their survival or territorial integrity is at stake. Thus, they are willing to take – and inflict – more casualties in a conflict and expend considerable resources. Finally, and perhaps most important, a heavy US role in counterinsurgency may discredit the government in question and lead to a nationalistic backlash, aiding the Islamist insurgents.

Fortunately, many allies may seek US support in their counterinsurgency efforts. Although the United States has an interest in the defeat of jihadist-linked insurgencies, this interest is usually dwarfed by the life-or-death concerns of the host government. The United States can provide equipment that will greatly bolster their firepower and mobility. Even more important, US special operations forces can offer training, helping regional militaries become more effective in combating guerrilla movements. US aid programs can also increase support for the government by improving the material well-being of key areas.


Pressing State Sponsors and Aiding Weak States

Allies are also useful for pressing state sponsors of terrorism through traditional military and economic coercion. States are more likely to resist US pressure if they believe that other powerful states, or states that they view as potential supporters for ideological reasons, are not likely to condemn them.\textsuperscript{41} Thus, allies that offer significant economic, military, and diplomatic clout are useful for countering traditional state sponsors.

After the fall of the Taliban, however, Al Qaeda no longer enjoys a state sponsor. Rather, the primary problem of sponsorship for Al Qaeda is linked to so-called passive sponsors – states that look the other way while the organization acts on their soil – or weak states that try but fail to suppress it.

Passive sponsorship can be combated in a variety of ways. Several of the most important include attempts to shame the regime into cooperating – a sanction that is far more powerful if it involves global, as opposed to merely US, condemnation. Allies can also help ostracize passive sponsors diplomatically and economically or appeal to their publics to diminish support for the terrorists.\textsuperscript{42}

Allies can also be vital for aiding weak or failed states. They can provide training for security services, money for reconstruction, expertise to rebuild an infrastructure and establishing a rule of law, and other important dimensions of reconstruction.\textsuperscript{43} Foreign governments can play a valuable role in providing security and otherwise assisting the rebuilding of destroyed countries. Such a role is both costly and time-consuming. It may take decades for the locals to be able to assume responsibility for their own security.\textsuperscript{44}

The coordination of these tasks, as noted below, may be best done not through bilateral or multilateral structures, but rather through international organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank. To achieve this coordination, however, the United States will have to work with key partners to make this a priority and to ensure action.

\textsuperscript{41}See Daniel Byman, \textit{Deadly Dynamics: States that Sponsor Terrorism} (New York: Cambridge UP 2005) for more on this issue.
\textsuperscript{43}James Dobbins \textit{et al.}, \textit{America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq} (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2003), 149–66.
Adding Legitimacy

The presence of allies adds to the overall legitimacy of the US effort overseas. Such additional legitimacy, in turn, reduces local opposition to cooperation with the United States. Indeed, the lack of allies suggests the terrorists’ cause enjoys some sympathy and thus they enjoy a degree of legitimacy. Such local support is particularly useful in parts of the world (including almost the entire Muslim world) where the United States is unpopular, and where many unilateral initiatives would be resisted simply because they bear the US stamp.

Allies also confer additional legitimacy at home, a particularly important benefit as many of the means of counterterrorism are not widely accepted. International support can bolster the arguments of US leaders, convincing domestic audiences that both their objectives and their particular tactics are justified. Such support is particularly important for controversial counterterrorism tools such as preventive detentions, targeted killings, extraordinary renditions, and other practices that are not typical of domestic law enforcement or standard wartime operations. France, for example, saw domestic support for a strong counterterrorism program eroded in the aftermath of the war in Algeria, when many counterterrorism methods were deemed illegitimate.

Additional Criteria

The above criteria are directly linked to the US strategy against Al Qaeda. The alliance dimension of the effort, however, should also consider two additional factors: whether a country is currently or may soon suffer Al Qaeda-linked violence or hosts a significant presence and whether the country is part of an existing US alliance.

Victims and Hosts

The ‘theater’ of counterterrorism is in large part defined by where Al Qaeda or its affiliates have a significant presence. To prevail, the United States must be able to destroy or disrupt Al Qaeda in these regions. Particular areas of importance where Al Qaeda or an affiliate

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are attacking the local regime include Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kashmir, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. In Kenya, Mauritanian, and Yemen the level of anti-regime violence by Islamists has been limited, but affiliates still strike in these countries and use them for logistics. Given Al Qaeda’s Islamist orientation, it is no surprise that these countries are primarily in the Muslim world.

Al Qaeda has also made inroads among the Muslim diaspora – another host. European discrimination and hostility toward Muslim assimilation have left large communities bitter and susceptible to recruitment: the United Kingdom and Germany are over 3 percent Muslim, while the figure for France may be over twice as high. Such figures are small, and of course the vast majority do not support terrorism. However, even a few hundred supporters among these millions is a particular problem, as European Muslims are able to operate far more effectively in the West than radicals from the Muslim world who lack the language skills and area familiarity. Already, this network has assisted jihadists trying to fight the United States in Iraq (though the scale of this assistance is dwarfed by indigenous efforts not linked to the jihadists) as well as attempted or conducted attacks in Spain, France, Britain, and other countries. Al Qaeda has reportedly tried to build this network since 9/11.

Denying the jihadists a victory requires ensuring that no states fall into their power. Afghanistan under the Taliban and Sudan under the influence of Turabi both demonstrate how dangerous a jihadist-led state can be. In both instances, the regime backed a variety of terrorist groups (including Al Qaeda) and supported Islamist insurgencies on their border. Fortunately, both Sudan and Afghanistan were exceptionally weak states. Control of a country rich in natural resources like Saudi Arabia would be exponentially more dangerous as jihadists would have far more money, and far more dangerous weapons, with which to pursue their goals (and control of a country like Saudi Arabia is one of Al Qaeda’s top objectives).

Countries to watch in addition to Saudi Arabia are Indonesia, Iraq, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Indonesia, of course, faces a skilled Islamist terrorist group, the Jemaah Islamiyya, that has conducted several terrorist attacks against the regime and foreign targets, most notably the bombing of a discotheque in Bali in October 2002 that killed 202 people,
many of whom were Australian tourists. Indonesia remains a potential hotbed of unrest, with myriad ethnic and sectarian problems. Jihadists could exploit any problems to increase their influence.

In Iraq, the current insurgencies against the US-backed Iraqi government stem from a host of problems, only some of which are linked to foreign or indigenous jihadists. However, al Anbar province in Iraq is becoming a training ground for jihadists and an area for them to form connections. Ensuring that these jihadists do not dominate the current insurgency is essential for the struggle against Al Qaeda.

Nigeria too faces several terrorist groups that espouse a jihadist ideology. Its Muslim and Christian communities have clashed in recent years over such issues as the imposition of Islamic law in parts of the country and the overall division of power. The country’s poverty, corruption, and poor governance make it a prime candidate for unrest that could be exploited. Several Muslim areas have replaced the secular criminal code with Islamic law.

Pakistan, of course, currently suffers numerous jihadist groups (and sponsors others). However, the situation in Pakistan may grow much worse, with jihadists active in Kashmir becoming closer to Al Qaeda – something Lashkar-e-Tayyiba appears to have done in recent months. Moreover, with the fall of the Taliban many Al Qaeda operatives relocated to Pakistan’s cities and to remote parts of the country that traditionally have had at best loose central-government control. The fall of a country like Pakistan to jihadists would be a particular nightmare given the country’s nuclear arsenal.

Being at risk gives potential allies a particular incentive to work with the United States. As Steven David noted over a decade ago, Third World leaders are likely to focus more on countering domestic threats than on external ones. Al Qaeda and its allies pose just such a threat. Not surprisingly, the United States has had little trouble convincing such disparate allies as Saudi Arabia, France, and Singapore of the need to cooperate on Al Qaeda, despite disagreement on a host of other issues. The trickier problem is getting such countries to cooperate with regard to Al Qaeda affiliates that may not, for now, threaten them directly.

Even if there is little risk of the regime falling (say in Indonesia, Kenya, or in Europe), the presence of a large sympathetic population

51 Faithful, but not fanatics, The Economist, 28 June 2003, 50.
52 David, Choosing Sides, 6.
and active affiliate groups is a significant counterterrorism problem. Jihadists can use these countries as a logistics base for recruitment, planning, and fundraising.

**Members of an Existing Alliance**

Setting up a robust alliance is a difficult endeavor. Trust must be established, procedures must be worked out and a division of labor or system of collaboration agreed upon, among many difficult and time-consuming measures. Policymakers and soldiers on both sides of the Atlantic spent decades ensuring the NATO members coordinated their strategies, had complementary logistics and communications structures, had military forces trained to fight together, and minimized duplication and gaps. Even after this massive effort, many problems remained. Given these costs, it is often better to use a flawed but established structure rather than try to create a new one.

**How Has the Role of Allies Changed? (Or What Aren’t the Criteria?)**

Some of the criteria above are standard for choosing alliances, but many others are quite different from the alliances of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, to say nothing of the interwar period or the era before World War I. During the Cold War, US alliances focused primarily on containing Soviet power, though the interpretation of what that meant in practice often differed considerably. After the Berlin Wall fell, strategists envisioned alliances to serve several purposes, including containing regional aggressors, particularly Iraq and North Korea, intervening in the Balkans, Somalia, and elsewhere, and helping ensure stability in key regions, particularly Asia, Western Europe, and the Persian Gulf. During this time, key allies included the European states that formed NATO, Japan, South Korea, and pro-US monarchies in the Persian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia. The most attention was paid to states that offered considerable industrial power, and by extension had military potential.

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55 Some scholars even predicted that after the end of the Cold War great powers would not intervene in the developing world unless they had an economic interest to do so. James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, ‘A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era’, *International Organization* 46/2 (Spring 1992), 486.
In the effort against terrorism, weak states are often more important than strong states because they are both the locations of trouble and key actors in the fight. Although economic growth is hardly a guarantee of freedom from a serious problem with a domestic Islamist terrorist group, a high per capita gross domestic product and advanced information society apparently is. None of the world’s wealthiest countries face a major insurgency. Even the strongest states in the Muslim world (Turkey, Egypt, and Indonesia) have at best a limited industrial and military base when compared with traditional major powers such as Japan, Britain, or Germany.

Unfortunately, traditional military power is of limited use to the United States for the war on terrorism today. Now that the Taliban are gone, there is no overt state sponsor left to topple that actively supports Al Qaeda. US military preponderance should be more than enough to deter another regime from taking the Taliban’s place as an active sponsor of Al Qaeda, and in the unlikely event this fails should be able to remove it from power. Al Qaeda, unfortunately, has weathered the loss of its sponsor and remains lethal. Thus, the additional divisions or other assets that NATO countries can add are of at best limited utility.

Allied counterinsurgency capabilities, however, do remain useful, as do several other less typical aspects of military power. In Afghanistan special operations forces from Australia, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, and Turkey contributed. However, among traditional US allies in Europe and Asia, only a few ever developed strong counterinsurgency capabilities with a robust training mission, and perhaps only France and Britain today retain these.

Location still matters, but the particulars have changed considerably. Needless to say, the Fulda Gap is not a front for terrorism. Nor is the Iraq–Kuwait border, the Demilitarized Zone in Korea, or other potential post-Cold War hotspots. Rather, the locus of concern has shifted to the Muslim world, including such disparate regions as parts of East and West Africa, Southeast and South Asia, and Central Asia.

Barry Posen notes that the United States is largely unmatched in most areas of conventional capability. See ‘Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony’, International Security 28/1 (Summer 2003), 5–46. Posen, however, also contends that peacekeeping is heavily troop intensive and thus operations like Iraq may prove a strain on US forces that inhibit other missions.

Bensahel points out that NATO or other allied conventional assets may ‘backfill’ US forces in places such as the Balkans, freeing them up for operations linked to the effort against terrorism.

Posen, for example, calls for reorienting several light conventional units toward the counterterrorist mission. Posen, ‘The Struggle against Terrorism’, 4–48.

For example, Secretary of State Colin Powell declared Central Asia is now of ‘strategic importance to US foreign policy initiatives’. Secretary of State
Even within this new locus, there is no front. It is a truism that terrorists seek to avoid a conventional military clash, where they would easily be overwhelmed by better armed and trained conventional military forces. Thus, counterterrorism operations must go beyond ensuring conventional military superiority over a fixed geographical area.

**Old Dilemmas in New Bottles**

Alliances are not cost-free. During the Cold War, the United States feared that its allies would entrap it in local conventional conflicts, worried about being associated with brutal, but anti-Communist, regimes, and tried to ensure that its allies would not exploit the US presence to minimize their own contributions to defense, among many other concerns. Similar problems exist for the war on terrorism, though the particulars vary.

**Competition to Avoid Al Qaeda’s Wrath**

A painful truth about counterterrorism is that states may make concessions in the hopes of avoiding terrorists’ wrath or, more accurately, of shifting them on to another target. During the 1970s and much of the 1980s, for example, France cut deals with a number of terrorist groups and their state sponsors, believing it could avoid being targeted in exchange for what it saw as minor concessions. The temptation for allies to do this in the effort against Al Qaeda is immense, particularly if they feel vulnerable due to their own large and restive Muslim populations.

States may fear that increasing ties to the United States will lead Al Qaeda to attack them. Osama Bin Laden made this tie clear in a threat to Australia, claiming: ‘We warned Australia before not to join in [the war] in Afghanistan, and [against] its despicable effort to separate East Timor. It ignored the warning until it woke up to the sounds of explosions in Bali.’ In April 2004, Bin Ladin again tried to play on this tension, explicitly offering a ‘truce’ to European states that refrained from what he described as hostile action in the Muslim world.

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62 Given that the United States is squarely in Al Qaeda’s sights, it may prove difficult for Washington to dodge Al Qaeda’s bullets. But even here it is not impossible. India,
This concern is not new: in the past states have feared that they would be attacked if they join an alliance hostile to a potential aggressor. Even Belgium, for example, avoided taking cooperative steps with France that would have improved both of their defensive positions vis-à-vis Germany in the years leading up to World War I as it feared that this would violate its neutrality and thus give Berlin a pretext to attack.

Passing the Buck

Even if allies do not make concessions to avoid Al Qaeda’s wrath, they may still do little, believing the United States will carry their water. Allies traditionally try to gain the most from one another at the least cost. Before World War II, French leaders feared that England would ‘fight her battles with French soldiers’. Such a problem was acute for the United States and NATO, where American preponderance at times led allies to try to avoid burden sharing.

Such a temptation is even greater in the war on terrorism. Because the United States is one of Al Qaeda’s top targets, other countries can rightly be confident that Washington will move to quash the organization even if they do not contribute their share.

Tarred with an Ally’s Brush

Just as an association with the United States often harms allied regimes, an ally’s own problems may tarnish the image of the United States and Russia, and of course Israel are high on Al Qaeda’s demonology, and the organization is constantly wrestling with its regional components over which countries and theaters are the proper ones. Al Qaeda attacked Israeli targets in Kenya and assisted the attack in Egypt, while it has championed Kashmiri and Chechen groups, a few of which (such as Lashkar-e-Tayyeba) share much of its ideology. In Saudi Arabia, for example, anti-government insurgents have called for fighters not to go to Iraq, declaring that the struggle against the Al Saud is more important. International Crisis Group, ‘Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who Are the Islamists?’, 21 Sept. 2004, 16.

63Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 145.
diminish support for the counterterrorism campaign today.\textsuperscript{67} In addition, US aid may shore up undemocratic allies, make them better able to resist reforms desirable from both a humanitarian and a counterterrorism perspective.

This problem is not new. As John Lewis Gaddis contends, a constant challenge for American leaders during the Cold War was ‘how to reinforce their allies without taking on their baggage’.\textsuperscript{68} Such tensions played out with regard to questions of whether to work with Britain and France in the Middle East despite their colonial role and whether to embrace anti-Communist Third World despot in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. It was particularly difficult to avoid being tarnished as developing world allies often made assistance in countering their domestic threat part of the price of their participation in a broader US alliance structure.\textsuperscript{69}

The day-to-day exigencies of counterterrorism exacerbate this problem. For example, Uzbekistan is home to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which is closely linked to Al Qaeda. In response to US requests for help after 9/11, the Uzbek government has offered the United States its bases as well as other assistance in the effort against Al Qaeda.\textsuperscript{70} US efforts to help crush these fighters and to gain Tashkent’s assistance in identifying and stopping others who may be active beyond Uzbekistan’s borders at times may lead Washington to downplay the Karimov regime’s brutal governance, which itself may be a long-term cause of violence in the region. Indeed, the United States may find itself helping strengthen Uzbekistan’s intelligence and counterinsurgency capabilities in order to help Tashkent fight Al Qaeda: aid that, in turn, makes the Karimov regime better able to crush dissent.

States also seek to use the legitimacy of the war on terrorism to bolster the legitimacy of their own particular goals. In the name of fighting terrorism, China too has suppressed the Uighur community in the province of Xinjiang, generating resentment and occasional violence there.\textsuperscript{71} Russia seeks to snuff out Chechen nationalism to prevent secession. India wants to crush the Kashmir insurgency in order to consolidate its control over the disputed area. In these and many


\textsuperscript{68}John Lewis Gaddis, \textit{We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History} (New York: OUP 1997), 167.

\textsuperscript{69}David, \textit{Choosing Sides}, 196.

\textsuperscript{70}This was formalized as a strategic partnership with Uzbekistan in March 2002. See <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/202/8736.htm>.

\textsuperscript{71}The Great Leap West’, \textit{The Economist}, 28 Aug. 2004, 38.
other instances, the United States has at times condemned its ally’s actions, or at least expressed discomfort. But these regimes have countered by linking their actions to the war on terrorism. Not surprisingly, US denunciations of Russia’s brutality in Chechnya have become softer and less frequent.

Israel is the most problematic ally in this regard. Regardless of one’s views on its dispute with the Palestinians, the constant violence of the second Intifada has further inflamed Muslim opinion against the United States, Israel’s most prominent supporter. Bin Laden himself has denounced Washington repeatedly in this regard. In his famous 1998 declaration, he noted that various US policies in the Middle East are meant ‘to serve the Jews’ petty state’. Subsequent statements have echoed this theme, decrying Israel’s repression of Palestinians and justifying attacks on Americans by claiming that the United States encourages Israeli brutality.

The picture is not entirely gloomy. By bringing states into an alliance, the United States can decrease conflicts among them and can ‘socialize’ allies toward better behavior. NATO, for example, not only served to counter the Soviets but also to mitigate conflict among its members. Alliances can also provide an additional incentive for governments to respect human rights, improve the level of power sharing, and decrease their reliance on force to solve disputes. Over time, perhaps, some allies may become less brutal.

The risk of being tarred with an ally’s brush in counterterrorism is particularly high, as many of the United States’ most important allies in the war on terrorism are authoritarian regimes, several of which lack legitimacy. Nigeria, Pakistan, and every country in the Arab world have stagnating economies and repressive political systems. Even in Western Europe, discrimination against Muslim minorities can be intense, and assimilation is discouraged. Americans may oppose close ties to these regimes, seeing their repression as fundamentally hostile to US values. Washington’s ambitions of promoting democracy and improving governance also will be frustrated.

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74 Weitsman, ‘Intimate Enemies’, 156.
75 Art makes a strong case that long-standing US alliances have a profound socialization effect. See Art, A Grand Strategy for America, 163.
Although this problem was manifest in the debate over US support for various despots in the developing world during the Cold War, it is particularly acute for the war on Al Qaeda, as the terrorist organization exploits these problems. One commonly cited cause of terrorism in general, and of Islamist violence in particular, is the repressive political environment in many of the countries in which they operate. By working with allies – and, presumably, by strengthening them through cooperation – the United States may be perpetuating the very problem it seeks to end.

The Curse of US Help

One reason states often enter an alliance is to enhance their image and, through this, improve their legitimacy with domestic audiences. And indeed, for the United States, its ties to allies increase the legitimacy of its actions at home.

This rule does not hold true for many US allies, however. Although ties to the United States can offer a host of material benefits, such a relationship often undermines the legitimacy of a regime. Any regime that depends on foreigners for internal security is likely to have its nationalist credentials damaged.

This abstract challenge is far worse in reality, as the United States is highly unpopular throughout much of the world. In France and Germany, favorable impressions of the United States are under 40 percent. Impressions are even more dismal in the Muslim world: in Jordan, only an astonishingly low 5 percent of the population has a favorable impression of the United States. Osama Bin Laden, in contrast, enjoys a 65 percent favorable rating in Pakistan and a 55 percent favorable rating in Jordan. An August 2003 poll taken by

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77 The linkage between terrorism and political opportunities has some support but requires further research. Terrorists often choose violence (and are more likely to gain support when they use it) when other means of political expression are not available. See in particular Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice’, in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 1998), 7–24.

78 Walt makes this point about regimes in the Arab world during the Cold War. Walt, Origins of Alliances, 149.

Herald-Gallup indicated that 69 percent argued for hurting American ‘where possible’ in response to US strikes in Iraq.\textsuperscript{80}

Such sensitivity has profound ramifications. Regimes fear that opposition groups will capitalize on their ties to the United States and thus seek to keep an American role in the shadows.\textsuperscript{81} In Pakistan, for example, the Musharraf regime has sought to keep the US ‘footprint’ light, and complaints have arisen even over the deployment of limited numbers of special operations forces.\textsuperscript{82} Even more broadly, a supportive regime may find itself in Al Qaeda’s crosshairs, when its neutrality would have allowed it to escape completely.

Allies’ reluctance to associate publicly with the United States may be less of a problem for counterterrorism, where quiet cooperation is what is needed, in contrast to the more visible cooperation inherent in conventional military alliances. Traditional alliances were formed in large part as a visible deterrent to another state. Playing down the closeness of allies thus risked lowering its credibility. Counterterrorism alliances, however, are formed not to deter Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups but rather to strike at them, which can at times be done quietly.

\textit{Different Threat Perceptions and Interests}

A constant problem with any alliance is that the different members perceive the threat differently and, more broadly, have different interests. Britain and France, for example, both feared Germany before World War II, but Britain understandably was less alarmed by the growth of German power, believing (correctly) as an island nation it would have time to respond, while France feared (also correctly) that it might easily be overwhelmed as it was far more vulnerable to German land power.\textsuperscript{83}

These different perceptions lead may lead an ally to refuse to take an action or do it half-heartedly if it conflicts with its broader interests. Pakistan, for example, seeks a pro-Pakistan regime in Kabul and wants to wrest Kashmir away from India, interests that go directly against US goals to extinguish the remnants of the Taliban and to disrupt Al Qaeda’s recruitment and logistics networks, which are interwoven with those of Kashmiri jihadists.\textsuperscript{84} Islamabad thus has acted sluggishly at

\textsuperscript{80}C. Christine Fair, ‘Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27/6 (Nov./Dec. 2004), 8.
\textsuperscript{81}Fortunately, intelligence sharing is often somewhat independent of the strength of the overall bilateral relationship. See also Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison’.
\textsuperscript{82}Fair, ‘India and Pakistan’, 30–32.
\textsuperscript{84}Fair, ‘India and Pakistan’, 9.
best against Kashmiri militants and may even allow the Taliban to operate below the radar screen. 85

Allies in the war on terrorism may also disagree on means far more than did conventional military allies. Traditionally, allies would discuss different means to combine their military power, with disagreements as to the scope, level, and circumstances of cooperation. For counter-terrorism, however, allies may disagree on the instruments themselves. All may agree that Nigeria is vulnerable to insurgency, but some may call for internal reform, others for improving the security services, and still others for an aid package.

**Life on the ‘Chain Gang’**

A related problem and constant fear is that an ally’s local struggles will suck in its friends, creating a broader conflict that has little to do with the original purpose of the alliance. Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder contend that perceptions of offense dominance encourages ‘chain-ganging’, as states fear that a loss for an ally will disproportionately harm their security. Thus they follow their allies down disastrous roads, even when the local conflict in question is not directly tied to their security. 86 Similarly, Glenn Snyder notes that entrapment is an alliance problem when the preservation of an alliance matters more than the costs of fighting on behalf of the ally. 87

Chain gangs are a particular concern as most terrorism is local, and relatively few groups so far target the United States. Indeed, many Islamists have criticized Al Qaeda for focusing on the United States over more important local governments. 88 If the United States actively sided with a local government, the terrorists may expand their targeting to include Americans. 89 But restraint is not always the answer. Some local jihadist groups morph on their own into anti-American groups.

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85 Anonymous, *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror* (Washington DC: Brassey’s 2004), 54–55.
86 Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, ‘Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity’, *International Organization* 44/2 (Spring 1990) pp.139. The authors contend that chain gangs are not inevitable under bipolarity and that “buck-passing” is more likely.
89 Some analysts contend that alliance formation can lead to blowback, arguing that the US-Saudi alliance led Al Qaeda to target the United States. Christopher Layne, ‘Offshore Balancing Revisited’, *The Washington Quarterly* 25/2 (Spring 2002), 240. This argument ignores the myriad reasons Al Qaeda is opposed to the United States independent of the US military presence in Saudi Arabia. In any event, after 9/11 and the subsequent US campaign, there is little chance Al Qaeda hostility will end even if
Kashmiri militants, for example, have recently been found fighting US forces in Iraq. Targeting them before they begin killing Americans would be ideal.

In addition, an ally may try to exploit the United States for its local agenda. Central Asian states, for example, hope to use counterterrorism ties to the United States as a way of strengthening their position vis-à-vis Moscow. This effort may complicate US–Russia relations, with profound ramifications.

**Culture and Capacity**

Many of the countries that the United States seeks as allies have a limited bureaucratic capacity. Indeed, a facilitating condition for unrest and the development of an insurgent movement is a weak government that cannot extend its influence.

The United States faces such a problem with one of its most important allies: Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government is highly personalized, with institutions often being little more than a brittle shell surrounding one individual. Decision making is highly centralized, and the number of competent bureaucrats is low. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, revolves around Prince Saud al-Faisal: others in the ministry cannot, and will not, make important decisions. Many Saudi institutions barely function or function poorly. For example, Saudi Arabia’s military forces remain inept, even by regional standards, despite having billions of dollars lavished on them over several decades and being trained by American, British, and other Western forces. Not surprisingly, the Saudi regime was often unable to respond to repeated requests for counterterrorism assistance. Lee Wolosky, a former Bush and Clinton administration staffer on the National Security Council, noted, ‘You have to be very careful what you ask for from the Saudis because if you have a list of more than one item you frequently don’t get to the second.’

Another change for the United States is that it is operating primarily with countries with which it does not share the same close historical association as it did with Europe – a change that in general can hinder
the maintenance of an alliance. Although the Arab American (and Muslim) population of the United States is growing, it is a fraction of those descended from Europe, Asia, or Latin America. As a result, much of the relationship will not be anchored in the strong person-to-person relationships and cultural understandings that shaped US alliances historically.

More than Counterterrorism

Although counterterrorism has moved from a peripheral issue to the top of America’s foreign policy agenda, other interests must remain paramount. North Korea’s behavior with regard to its nuclear program is erratic. Japan and Canada are vital economic partners. China is an emerging great power and a nuclear one as well. The United States has historic and increasingly cultural and trade ties to Latin America. All of these are counterterrorism backwaters, but these vital interests will, and should, compete with counterterrorism. Indeed, it would be disastrous if the struggle against Al Qaeda led the United States to neglect traditional allies.

Yet such an injunction is difficult in practice. Senior policymakers have only so much time: if they are focused on trade, they have less time for counterterrorism, and vice-versa. Even more difficult is when counterterrorism conflicts with other interests with regard to a particular country. The United States has a strong interest in working with Mexico and Canada to secure common borders from terrorist penetration. Yet inspecting more trucks or increasing scrutiny of cross-border visitors would slow down trade and tourism with two of America’s most important partners.

In Pakistan this tension grows astronomically. In contrast to Canada or Mexico, the Pakistani government capacity is weak: it is hard to expect it to improve its performance on many areas, as its senior leaders can and will only concentrate on a few. Pakistan has a nuclear program over which it has demonstrated little control in the past. It is engaged in a proxy war with India. And the stability of the country itself is weak. In this maelstrom, counterterrorism should not always be the top US concern.

A New Alliance Architecture

The need for reconsidering the US alliance structure becomes clear when the above criteria and dilemmas are applied to countries around

the world today. Many of the most important countries for the war on terrorism are in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa, in contrast to the Cold War focus on Europe, Japan, and relations among the Great Powers.

Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey remain the important allies they were during the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War eras, though what we seek of these allies has changed because of the struggle against Al Qaeda. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey all can offer considerable intelligence on jihadists as they all have recently suffered considerable attacks, and Saudi Arabia and Egypt in particular still face formidable terrorists. Egypt also successfully beat back an Islamist insurgency in the early 1990s, while Turkey fought Kurdish insurgents successfully as well, suggesting robust counterinsurgency capabilities. In different ways, all three have influence in the Muslim world: Turkey because of its model of successful modernization; Egypt because of its historic stature; and Saudi Arabia because of its oil wealth and links to Islamist ideologues. Britain and France have military forces capable of training other militaries in counterinsurgency. In addition, both have excellent intelligence capabilities on the jihadist movement that goes well beyond the activities within their borders.95

Canada and Mexico are not essential for most aspects of the war on terrorism, but they are crucial for successful border control and thus of vital importance for counterterrorism. Neither country, of course, faces a serious problem from Islamist terrorists, and, not surprisingly, their intelligence capabilities on this problem are limited. Canada, as a major economy, can help influence state sponsors, but Mexico’s influence is far more limited. Nevertheless, if either country refused to cooperate with US officials in policing their borders, it would be far easier for jihadists to penetrate into the United States to conduct attacks.

In contrast, several vital allies in the pre-9/11 era are less important for the struggle against Al Qaeda. China, Germany, Japan, and South Korea all matter less than before when the US focus is on Al Qaeda, although all four wield enough economic clout to be important in pressing potential state sponsors. Their capabilities against Al Qaeda are limited, particularly with regard to intelligence and influence in the Muslim world (and, indeed, China may be a negative because of its oppression of the Uighurs). Of course, these states remain important (and several are vital) for a host of other US security concerns.

Several states are now important allies that were vital during the Cold War or before 9/11. They include Afghanistan, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen. Two of these were adversaries (Afghanistan and Iraq), one was a failed state (Somalia), and three were of little concern (Kenya, Mali, and Yemen). Nigeria received marginally more attention as a potential partner. Several of these countries, however, are now at the heart of the struggle against terrorism. In particular, many face jihadist-linked violence and insurgencies, and several could plausibly succumb to the jihadists in the coming years. Most (Afghanistan, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, and Somalia) are located where the Muslim world and the non-Muslim worlds meet. Unfortunately, in almost all of these cases, alliance structures must be built from scratch.

India, Indonesia, and Pakistan are new vital allies that deserve particular attention, as their pre-9/11 role in the US alliance posture was limited. All three suffer Islamist-linked unrest and are major players in the Muslim world (India, a predominantly Hindu country, has more Muslim citizens than do Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia combined while Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim country and Pakistan one of its largest). All three have vital intelligence and counterinsurgency roles. The United States cooperated fitfully with all three countries during the Cold War, and in the years before 9/11 improving relations with India became a priority of the Clinton and Bush administrations. However, the closeness of the ties remained far from the relationship with key Cold War-era allies such as Canada or Japan. Making this even more difficult, India and Pakistan are bitter enemies, and Islamabad’s support for the jihadist movement is bound up in its strategy for countering India in Kashmir. Nevertheless, for counterterrorism these three countries have an importance similar to Germany during the Cold War: they are all battlegrounds and vital local partners who have considerable assets to offer.

Allies, but What Type?

The above list of old and potential new allies is vast. In contrast to the ties that bound NATO together, they differ in their culture, power, and location as well as their interests and the threats they face. But we should not simply change the names of our allies while keeping the same approach and institutions. The US alliance structure should reflect these differences and the particular needs of counterterrorism to determine how much institutionalization is desirable (and possible) and whether the alliance should be bilateral, multilateral, or involve an international organization.

Much of the war on terrorism does not need to be institutionalized, and indeed might founder should this be a criterion for alliances.
The common historic and cultural ties that helped bind the United States and other NATO members are lacking with countries like Pakistan, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia. More important, the threat perception and interests are quite different. Although all these countries run risks from jihadist terrorism (and the United States and Saudi Arabia share a common phobia about Iran), other threats are quite different. Pakistan's overwhelming security concern is the threat from India, which Washington increasingly sees as an ally. Nigeria seeks to be the preeminent force in western Africa, a goal the United States views largely with indifference.

The United States also has important policy differences with several of these countries: Nigeria is criticized due to rampant corruption and communal violence, Pakistan for its support for Kashmiri insurgents against India, and so on. As a result of these many differences, the high degree of institutionalization would be difficult to attain – a problem compounded by the limited institutional capacity of several of these states. Moreover, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, it would be surprising to see strong cooperation outside the immediate issue of striking jihadists.

The above factors suggest any success is likely to be limited, but some institutionalization is desirable for intelligence sharing, perhaps the most important element of counterterrorism. Intelligence sharing can be far more effective when there is a high degree of integration and at times even institutionalization. Running sources jointly, and sharing information from special activities, often requires close cooperation. Thus US officials should strive for some institutionalization while recognizing the likely limits to any success. Day-to-day policing and intelligence disruption operations in general will involve limited institutionalization, as the location will vary considerably. However, in cases like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia where the Al Qaeda-linked jihadist presence is sustained, a more institutionalized structure is sensible to make these efforts run more smoothly.

Many of the tasks for counterterrorism alliances are better done in a bilateral setting. Counterinsurgency cooperation, for example, would not benefit from a large and integrated NATO-like organization, as the insurgent threat is almost invariably confined to one government. Intelligence sharing is seldom done on a multilateral basis in a serious way. Although in theory the more information pooled the better, in practice intelligence services guard their sources and methods tightly and water down the quality of what is shared as the circle of countries receiving it widens.96 For similar reasons, the day-to-day intelligence and law enforcement efforts to take suspected terrorists off the streets is

96Pillar, Terrorism and US Foreign Policy, 75–76.
best done through overall US coordination of various bilateral efforts as more actors will simply complicate local efforts.

For now, active state sponsorship is not a major problem with regard to Al Qaeda, but passive sponsorship remains an issue. Common standards to deny terrorism fundraising, recruitment and other institutional necessities are necessary, as jihadist terrorists can shift bases to exploit lax controls in one country. Here a quite different system is needed from the Cold War. The comparison should not be NATO, but rather conventions used to combat money laundering – more of a regime than what is traditionally considered to be an alliance. The actions demanded are far more limited than providing intelligence or military forces to hunt Al Qaeda around the world, but the number of actors needed to fix this problem is large.

NATO itself does have a role, but it is limited at best. NATO is an excellent venue for Western allies to discuss problems and propose solutions. Most of this discussion, however, was traditionally among military leaders: and the military is a less important player than intelligence agencies in counterterrorism. NATO can play a role in helping various counterinsurgency efforts, where the military role is greater. In particular, NATO can increase training and provide limited direct assistance to countries that are battling insurgencies linked to Islamists.

The problem of weak states also requires widespread involvement (or at least the support of many wealthy states), but here the costs are far higher. The weak state problem is a classic collective action one: many states have an interest in preventing it from becoming a terrorist haven, but the enormity of the task makes it difficult for any state to take on the challenge. International institutions like the World Bank are in theory dedicated to the general problem of reconstruction, but their agendas are not linked to the challenge of counterterrorism. Similarly, James Fearon and David Laitin argue that the United Nations can be used to coordinate efforts to build weak states and ensure proper accountability in the process. For this challenge, existing institutions can be redirected to focus more on countries at risk from terrorism without dramatically deviating from its mission of reconstruction. To provide this public good, the United States should work with other major powers to use their influence both to change institutions’ agendas and to build their capacity.

Figure 2 displays the types of cooperation needed, looking at both the degree of institutionalization and whether it should be bilateral,

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97 For a list of recommendations on this issue, see Byman, ‘Confronting Passive Sponsors of Terrorism’, 29–33.
multilateral, or through an international organization. As the figure suggests, the most important cooperation is done on a bilateral basis, while international organizations and informal regimes can play a valuable. Multilateral structures, however, are far less important for counterterrorism.

Recommendations for Working with Allies on the War on Terrorism

Picking new countries to ally with and deciding the depth and type of the arrangement is not enough: the United States must also restructure its foreign policy to make new alliances possible and strengthen old ones with regard to counterterrorism. This subsection briefly reviews several of the most important changes with regard to US diplomacy, military posture, intelligence operations, and internal reform. These proposed reforms, however, must be taken only when other US interests unrelated to counterterrorism are also weighed.

Diplomacy

The United States must identify and court new partners if it is to succeed in the war on terrorism. As noted above, relations with India, Pakistan, and Indonesia should become top US priorities. Also important are Afghanistan, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen. In only a few of these countries does the United States have

Figure 2. Types of cooperation structures for vital counterterrorism tasks.
large embassies that are able to reach out to all important government of the agencies, develop contacts among local elites, woo the broader population, and otherwise conduct the many tasks of diplomacy. Both the money and personnel devoted to these countries should be increased. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s proposal to restructure State Department staffing to focus more on the developing world is a useful first step in this direction. Also vital is her proposal to increase the number of posts outside capital cities to increase the US presence in different parts of a country.\textsuperscript{99} In Nigeria, for example, the United States needs more information and focus on Muslim parts of the country and any possible growth in jihadist ideology there: information that requires going to parts of Nigeria traditionally of little concern to US diplomats.

The United States should also actively work to restart the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as this will assist the formation of alliances in the Middle East. The perception is almost universal that the United States endorses Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and condones Israeli mistreatment of the Palestinians. The United States must try to combat the increasingly widespread perception that it will support Israel’s position uncritically. Israel should be encouraged to accept the recommendations of the Mitchell Commission.\textsuperscript{100}

The United States must also make clear that it will differentiate among terrorist groups. The risk of being ‘chain-ganged’ into a conflict is immense, as every government has an incentive to tie its local struggle to the US effort against Al Qaeda. The United States should set a high bar for what is an Al Qaeda-linked insurgency and even areas like Chechnya, where the jihadist presence is real but limited, should be approached with extreme caution.\textsuperscript{101} Associating every terrorist or even Islamist cause with Al Qaeda only adds to the movement’s luster and makes new enemies for the United States.

\textbf{Military}

For the war on terrorism, counterinsurgency is the primary military task, with specific counterterrorism missions (e.g. assassinations, reconnaissance, captures) a distant second. Counterinsurgency, however, is almost invariably something done in cooperation with local allies. The most important military units will be special operations forces (SOF), which

\textsuperscript{99}See Rice, ‘Transformational Diplomacy’.
\textsuperscript{100}Walt, ‘Beyond bin Laden’, 72.
currently number around 50,000 – roughly two percent of total US forces. SOF will train foreign troops to fight insurgents, liaise with local populations, help gather intelligence, and otherwise serve as the foundation for the military’s broader efforts against terrorism and insurgency. The Defense Department has expanded the size of SOF since 9/11 should continue to increase the overall number.102

Restructuring US bases is also sensible, though this will not necessarily lead more troops to be stationed in America as is currently planned.103 Large, permanent bases may inflame nationalism in several countries yet offer little immediate benefit for the war on terrorism. Having more bases that are ‘ready to go’ however, reflects that Al Qaeda will constantly shift to areas of potential US weakness. Recent efforts to develop smaller bases that can act as ‘lily pads’ that are jumping off points in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, East and West Africa are a good first step.104 When possible, these bases should be unobtrusive. The value of these bases for counterterrorism, however, is usually far less than the worth of the overall support of the local regime’s intelligence and security apparatus. Efforts to secure military bases should defer to these concerns when necessary.

**Intelligence**

Intelligence is the heart of the effort against terrorism. Simply finding the terrorists is exceptionally difficult. Once found, in most cases they can be arrested or killed. The massive increases in intelligence spending since 9/11 are a logical reflection of this emphasis.

Given the vital role allies play, improved intelligence sharing is essential for success against terrorists. Intelligence agencies in general oppose sharing sensitive information with multiple partners, as it is more easily compromised. Not surprisingly, the United States has moved fitfully on intelligence sharing. Washington has greatly expanded the number of partnerships and the volume of information exchanged. Some allies complain, however, that this sharing is a one

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102 For a review of recent changes, see Andrew Feickert, ‘US Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research Service, 28 Sept. 2004. In addition to expanding SOF’s size, in 2003 the Defense Department has made Special Operations Command a ‘supported’ command, one that is capable of independent action and planning.


way street (a complaint US officials also make). Russia, for example, has complained about the willingness of the United States to share useful intelligence.105

In general information sharing with allies reflects a Cold War counterintelligence environment, in which a highly skilled adversary sought to exploit any weakness. Al Qaeda too is skilled, but its counterintelligence capabilities are a shadow of the Soviet Union’s. Perhaps more important, Al Qaeda is likely to exploit information gained from public sources (newspaper articles, court records, and so on). Information sharing procedures should be loosened to reflect this different counterintelligence environment.

Given the importance of intelligence gained from allies, counterintelligence against allied security services is vital. Washington must be sure that allies are indeed on board and that the information being passed to Washington is complete and accurate. It is vital for the United States to know if allied services are withholding information or, even worse, are penetrated by Al Qaeda.106 Such penetrations are particularly important in countries where the United States relies primarily on allies for intelligence because it has limited collection capabilities of its own.

The United States must also recognize the danger of unilateral intelligence and military operations on alliances, as well as their often limited rewards. The successful penetration of a terrorist group by a US-controlled agent would be a tremendous intelligence coup and might avert attacks or even lead to the disruption of a major network. On the other hand, a detected unilateral operation on an ally’s territory may anger the ally greatly, jeopardizing far more important overall cooperation. Particularly given the high degree of popular animosity toward the United States, the ally may respond by expelling US officials, curtailing the flow of information, or even publicly criticizing the United States and disrupting cooperation on other issues. Given that allies tend to have far more operations (and more effective ones) within their own countries than the United States is capable of mounting, the risks of unilateral operations backfiring is high. Such operations should be focused on countries where the government is providing minimal cooperation and should concentrate first and foremost on the local intelligence service, which is likely to have information it is not sharing.107

105’FSB Says CIA Holding Back in the War on Terror,’ Moscow Times, 24 April 2002. I would like to thank Nora Bensahel for bringing this point to my attention.
106Al Qaeda, of course, has probably penetrated some governments. Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, 24. The level of this penetration is nowhere near the masterful level of the Soviet Union.
107The benefits of unilateral operations may be overstated. Although many critics of the CIA grouse that it lacks individuals who can directly penetrate an organization like
Internal Security and Reform

The United States can bolster allied counterterrorism and counter-insurgency capabilities through programs dedicated to foreign internal security assistance. Many countries have weak security services and cannot control their borders. In Africa and the former Soviet Union, for example, many governments have poor and corrupt militaries and security services but must patrol vast borders.

The United States should greatly expand the scope and scale of security assistance programs. Allied intelligence and security forces are force multipliers, with small US investments paying huge dividends. Such programs were robust during the 1950s and 1960s, as Washington worked with local security forces against Communism. However, they were allowed to atrophy in the latter period of the Cold War and in its aftermath. These programs increased after 9/11, but they should be massively expanded.

Through such programs, the United States will make the allied state stronger: a benefit with regard to counterterrorism operations, but one that often makes repressive regimes more powerful and may even increase the potential for terrorism in the long-term. In the short-term, I contend that this price must be paid: weak regimes are simply too dangerous for the purposes of counterterrorism, and they are less likely to democratize without collapsing into strife. Moreover, the heavy short-term price of instability that comes with a US push for countries Al Qaeda, such an expectation ignores how the skilled terrorist organization itself vets candidates, preserves operational security, and otherwise screens for penetration. Indeed, as Pillar contends, ‘Terrorist operations that are funded on one continent, planned on another continent, and carried out on a third by perpetrators of multiple nationalities (as was true of the attacks of September 11) are unlikely to reveal their entire shape to even the most skilled local collection effort. Living where the water is bad, by itself, is apt to yield more stomach ailments than insights about terrorism – insights that are just as likely to be gleaned in the papers being pushed at Langley.’


Already US special operations forces are in West Africa, Central Asia, and other unusual locations to train local soldiers against groups linked to Al Qaeda. The State Department also has Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Programs to help train foreign law enforcement and security officers with regard to counterterrorism, and since 9/11 this training has focused on many countries in the Arab world, South Asia, and Central Asia, among other key areas. Craig S. Smith, ‘US Training African Forces to Uproot Terrorists’, New York Times, 11 May 2004, A1; US Dept. of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 (Washington DC 2004), 147–48.
to democratize might be worth paying if the long-term success were guaranteed. But it is not. The process of reform is fitful, and we lack a road map for ensuring success. The United States has devoted massive resources and many lives to establishing a democratic regime in Iraq and has met with only limited success. The failure of democratization, on the other hand, can spark terrorism or even an insurgency, as happened in Algeria after the regime aborted the 1991 elections.

Given this tension, the United States is better off encouraging the development of institutions that, over time, may make democracy more likely to take hold. Institutions such as the development of a strong court system or a free media can make society and government stronger and more effective. Over time, this may reduce some of the resentment of government as well. Should democratization efforts take hold, having these institutions makes democracy more likely to succeed.110

Conclusions

Ultimate success depends not only on fostering new alliance, but on managing them in the years to come. As Robert Art contends, managing an alliance requires consulting, compromising, and coordinating.111 Such an effort may prove difficult for the United States, however, as the power disparities make it tempting to dismiss allies’ concerns. In addition, many of the potential compromises are unsavory, as Washington may have to countenance a range of brutal behavior.

Money is a major US advantage, even more so than during the Cold War era. The vast majority of key allies are developing world nations with corrupt governments. Money can help these regimes placate their populations and bolster economic growth. In addition, the United States will be able to bribe local politicians to maintain the alliance.

Leadership – an overused word, admittedly – is also essential. As Stephen Walt has argued, ‘An obvious source of alliance durability is the exercise of hegemonic power by a strong alliance leader.’112 The United States can offer rewards and punishments to encourage participation and pay more of the costs of the alliance.

As policymakers take on these burdens and weigh these changes, they must recognize that the United States has many interests, several of

which are as important as counterterrorism. Just because Japan is not a major player in counterterrorism does not mean that Japan is no longer a vital ally. However, if counterterrorism is the top or a leading US priority, dramatic shifts are necessary. Reforming US foreign policy and making profound changes to the US military, intelligence services, and other institutions will take money, time, and leadership. Most important, it will take a degree of consensus. Many changes will require decades of effort, and presumably this will involve multiple administrations with different ideologies. A truly profound transformation, however, will require US leaders of both parties to span these political shifts with a common vision.

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