

Russian Anti-Semitism and the Scapegoating of Jews

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Throughout Russian history, Jews have often been blamed when turmoil has arisen in the country. It is surprising, therefore, that Russian politics in the 1990s focused so little on Jews as a source of the political and economic crises afflicting the country. This article investigates anti-Jewish attitudes in Russia over time and cross-sectionally, carefully scrutinizing the hypothesis that perceptions of economic, social and political upheaval activate latent authoritarianism into anti-Semitism. Little if any support is found for the hypothesis and therefore it is argued that scapegoat theory, as currently constituted and applied to Jews, is too simplistic to be useful. Russian Jews were not subject to intolerance and repression in the 1990s because anti-Semitic beliefs were not widespread enough to be used successfully by political entrepreneurs seeking advantage through attacks on Jews.

A common response to economic or political distress is to seek to apportion blame. Throughout the ages, political entrepreneurs have sought, often with considerable success, to deflect blame for their country's woes to powerless groups. Some cultures seem even to hold a standing presumption that particular groups are responsible for whatever ills should materialize. Finding a scapegoat when times go bad is often a task of utmost importance, for political leaders and ordinary citizens alike.

Scapegoat theory has long been relied upon to explain outbreaks of intolerance and repression of minority groups.¹ The process is simple: 'when there is tension and social problems seem insurmountable, find an innocent, weak, and distinctive group to blame and victimize.'² Historians, psychologists, sociologists and political scientists have used scapegoat theory to account for outbreaks of prejudice and intolerance, often painting vivid

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¹ According to W. E. Gregory in 'Scapegoating', in Edward Craighead and Charles B. Nemeroff, eds, *The Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology and Behavioral Science*, 3rd edn, Vol. 4 (New York: Wiley, 2001), p. 1444, 'Scapegoating is the process by which one finds a substitute victim on which to vent anger. The term comes from the Old Testament [*Leviticus* 16: 8, 10, 26] and refers to the goat driven into the desert on the Day of Atonement to carry away the sins of Israel. It was a way of canceling the sins of individual Israelites, so they were "wiped off the books." It has since come to mean any substitute receipt of anger or rejection.'

² Elisha Y. Babad, Max Birnbaum and Kenneth D. Benne, *The Social Self: Group Influences on Personal Identity* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publication, 1983), p. 103.

portraits of the most egregious exemplars. What fuelled the Nazi attack on Jews in the 1930s? Apprehension brought about by economic and political collapse, long-standing resentment and suspicion of Jews, and political entrepreneurs who found it useful to promulgate and popularize a theory of blame, according to scapegoat theory.

Though empirical support for this theory can be readily observed, social scientists all too often fail to examine carefully instances in which the theory *fails*. That is, a fair test of scapegoat theory requires examination not only of outbreaks of intolerance, but also of circumstances in which the state of the 'independent variables' leads to the prediction of intolerance and repression, irrespective of the actual outcome. To select cases on the basis of the 'dependent variable' (eruptions of intolerance) is to marshal the evidence unfairly in favour of the veracity of the theory, since, by definition, the cases are made up of instances in which intolerance and repression materialize.³ Scapegoat theory, therefore, has more widespread credence than it probably deserves on the basis of available evidence.

Our purpose here is to examine an instance in which scapegoat theory predicts that intolerance and repression would become prevalent: the case of Russian anti-Semitism during the recent transitional period in that country. In the last fifteen years or so, Russia has experienced extraordinary political, social and economic tumult. The Soviet Union collapsed, the Communist Party lost its grip on power, the rouble was decimated – several times – and Russia forfeited its designation as a world 'superpower'. Perhaps few countries in modern history have experienced the massive and comprehensive change that has taken place in Russia. When disruption of this magnitude occurs, winners and losers are created, and the losers often fail to accept their losses without a fight. Losers typically look for explanations for their plight, and, especially in the Russian context, they often attribute their fate to dark and sinister forces. Russian history is replete with instances in which Jews were identified as the primary source of the country's ills, and the consequence of this scapegoating has often been severe violence and repression directed against Jews – including, at different times, pogroms, purges, show trials, professional and educational quotas, bans on religious expression and ridicule in the popular culture. Rarely has there been a period in modern Russian history in which the likelihood of a major outbreak of anti-Semitism has been higher than in the last two decades.

We ground this analysis in the stipulation that, though Russian Jews have been subject to sporadic and unorganized harassment and attacks over the course of the last decade, at the same time, no substantial or sustained pogroms against Jews – state sponsored or otherwise – took place (we document the veracity of these assertions below). Furthermore, no legal restrictions were placed on Jews, and no systematic repression of Jews was implemented by the Russian state. Although Jewish emigration continued throughout the 1990s, the Russian leadership spoke out repeatedly against anti-Semitism, calling for tolerance. Finally, very few Russians blame Jews for the problems the country has experienced. We begin, therefore, with the empirical claim that the contemporary Russian case is most likely to illustrate an instance in which widespread scapegoating of Jews, so common throughout Russian history, failed to materialize.

Consequently, a puzzle presents itself. Why have intolerance and repression of Jews not been more apparent in Russia? The resolution of this conundrum lies in answering two ancillary questions: how anti-Semitic are the Russian people (what are their

³ See Barbara Geddes, 'How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics', in James A. Stimson, ed., *Political Analysis*, Vol. 2 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1990), pp. 131–50, for a similar argument.

predispositions?), and have Russians in fact experienced the economic and political tumult typically thought to convert latent prejudice into overt intolerance? Though few serious observers would discount the upheaval the Russian people endured during the 1990s, the extent of Russian anti-Semitism is more difficult to assess. Consequently, the degree to which ordinary Russians were consumed by anti-Jewish sentiment during this period of intense change must be investigated.

Thus, our purposes in this article are to investigate carefully the nature of contemporary Russian anti-Semitism and to test hypotheses derived from scapegoat theory in the Russian context. We employ unusually broad and deep sets of data to address these issues. First, we present evidence over the course of the 1990s on Russian attitudes towards Jews. Based on five comparable surveys of the views of ordinary Russians, we find little aggregate change in attitudes towards Jews. Incontrovertibly, the data reveal no evidence whatsoever of steadily rising antipathy towards Jews over the decade of the 1990s.

Our longitudinal measures are broad but not deep. In our survey in 2000, however, we included multiple indicators of anti-Jewish prejudice, allowing extensive testing of cross-sectional hypotheses drawn from scapegoat theory. Our most important conclusion is that anti-Jewish prejudice reflects personality characteristics such as dogmatism and xenophobia, and *is essentially impervious to influence from perceptions of external economic and political stress*. This latter finding no doubt accounts for the failure of anti-Jewish sentiment to become pernicious in Russia during the 1990s. Throughout the country's attempt at democratization, economic and political stress have been at high levels; some Russians hold predispositions towards intolerance; but the two factors have not joined forces to produce reactions against Jewish Russians. Thus, we conclude that scapegoat theory is at best incomplete and at worst seriously flawed when it comes to predicting outbreaks of intolerance and repression against Jews.

We must acknowledge at the outset that our test of scapegoat theory is incomplete. In this analysis, we focus on the scapegoating *of Jews*. We do so because Jews have been targeted so often throughout Russian history, and because the expectation was so widespread in the 1990s that Jews would be subject to intolerance and repression. We recognize, however, that while our empirical evidence does not support the view that Jews were targets of scapegoating, we cannot draw firm conclusions about whether Russians blame *other groups* for the woes of the country. We do provide some evidence below that Russia's problems were not attributed to Chechens, but available data are fragmentary. And in the conclusion, we speculate that Russians failed to target any particular scapegoat for the ills of the country, in part owing to objective ambiguity about whom to blame for the country's turmoil. So while we believe that the Russian case adds to scepticism about the value of scapegoat theory, we obviously cannot dismiss the theory altogether on the basis of the evidence presented here.

SCAPEGOATING

A vast literature exists linking economic and political distress with increasing perceptions of intergroup threat.⁴ During times of turmoil, political conflict is exacerbated, the stakes of politics rise and citizens become frustrated and often seek explanations for their

⁴ See, for example, Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, *Social Change and Prejudice* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964 [1950]); Tom Douglas, *Scapegoats: Transferring Blame* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

unhappiness.⁵ With the guidance of political entrepreneurs, these explanations typically indict those on the fringes of the political system. *Scapegoat theories* predict that threat perceptions will increase during times of economic and political turmoil⁶ and consequently that aggression (political intolerance and repression) will rise as well. As Green, Glaser and Rich describe the theory: 'frustrations attendant to economic downturns produce aggressive impulses that are directed at vulnerable targets, such as minority groups, even when these groups bear no actual or perceived responsibility for economic decline.'⁷

In research in the United States, several scholars have addressed the influence of environmental stress on prejudice and intolerance. For instance, Sales showed that authoritarian churches flourish in times of economic distress.⁸ In a more substantial study based on a variety of indicators of authoritarianism,⁹ Sales finds that 'environmental threat is associated with heightened authoritarianism'.¹⁰ Doty, Peterson and Winter confirm Sales's findings, using a broader array of indicators of social authoritarianism, including the frequency of anti-Semitic vandalism.¹¹ Altemeyer provides a nice metaphor for the influence of distress and threat on attitudes, suggesting that during times of social calm, the components of authoritarianism 'unglue' in the sense of becoming less strongly interconnected. Social stress teaches people 'what goes with what', 're-gluing' attitudes, making them more pernicious.¹²

Similar results have been reported from research in Russia by McFarland, Ageyev and Abalakina-Paap and McFarland, Ageyev and Hinton.¹³ The latter conclude:

⁵ See, for example, Robert A. LeVine and Donald T. Campbell, *Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971).

⁶ See, for example, P. P. Lauderdale, J. Smith-Cunnien and I. Inverarity, 'External Threat and the Definition of Deviance', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 49 (1984), 1058–68.

⁷ Donald P. Green, Jack Glaser and Andrew Rich, 'From Lynching to Gay Bashing: The Elusive Connection Between Economic Conditions and Hate Crime', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 75 (1998), 82–92, p. 82. Other examples of such arguments include the research on the increased lynching of American blacks during times of economic distress. See, for example, Carl Iver Hovland and Robert R. Sears, 'Minor Studies of Aggression: VI. Correlation of Lynchings with Economic Indices', *Journal of Psychology*, 9 (1940), 301–10 (for a contrary view, see Green, Glaser and Rich, 'From Lynching to Gay Bashing'). On the rise of fascism and anti-Semitism in Germany during the inter-war years, see John Dollard, Leonard W. Doob, Neal E. Miller, O. H. Mowrer and Robert R. Sears, *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1939), and on conflict between East and West Germans in the context of the reunification of Germany, see, for example, Amélie Mummendey and Thomas Kessler, 'Is There Any Scapegoat Around? Determinants of Intergroup Conflicts at Different Categorization Levels', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 81 (2001), 1090–102. Many theories of anti-Semitism rely on a basic scapegoating model. See, for example, Jack Levin and William C. Levin, *The Functions of Prejudice and Discrimination* (New York: Harper and Row, 1982); Michael Billig, *Fascists: A Social Psychological View of the National Front* (London: Academic Press, 1978), as well as the literature discussed below.

⁸ Stephen M. Sales, 'Economic Threat as a Determinant of Conversion Rates in Authoritarian and Nonauthoritarian Churches', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 23 (1972), 420–8.

⁹ See also Stewart J. H. McCann and Leonard L. Stewin, 'Good and Bad Years: An Index of American Social, Economic, and Political Threat (1920–1986)', *Journal of Psychology*, 63 (1990), 601–17.

¹⁰ Stephen M. Sales, 'Threat as a Factor in Authoritarianism: An Analysis of Archival Data', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 28 (1973), 44–57.

¹¹ Richard M. Doty, Bill E. Peterson and David G. Winter, 'Threat and Authoritarianism in the United States, 1978–1987', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 61 (1991), 629–40.

¹² Bob Altemeyer, *Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-Wing Authoritarianism* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988).

¹³ Sam G. McFarland, Vladimir S. Ageyev and Marina A. Abalakina-Paap, 'Authoritarianism in the Former Soviet Union', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 63 (1992), 1004–10; Sam G. McFarland, V. S.

In short, economic troubles in Russia (low income, worry about one's personal finances, and concern for the national economy) correlated with many of the social indicators of authoritarianism as well as with the RWA [Altemeyer's Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale], and these troubles appear to enhance these indicators even when personal authoritarianism scores are controlled.¹⁴

The overall conclusion of this body of research is that outbreaks of prejudice must be understood to flow from the general predispositions of people (authoritarianism) and perceived changes in environmental factors associated with the individual's sense of political and economic insecurity.¹⁵

Expectations and Fears of Scapegoating Russia's Jews

How realistic is it to think that Russia's Jews would be subjected to scapegoating? In answering this question, we rely upon three types of evidence to suggest the reasonableness of the scapegoating hypothesis: (1) Russian history, (2) evidence of the fears and expectations of pundits and interest groups, and (3) the observations and proclamations of scholars.

Russian history is replete with instances of scapegoating and persecution of the Jews. From pogroms throughout the Middle Ages up through the official doctrine of Imperial Russia, repeated instances of Jews being blamed and victimized can be documented. This insidious practice outlasted medieval times and the Enlightenment, and it resurfaced during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, dire repercussions landed on the Russian Jews, who, with the declaration of the May Laws of 1882, were forced to leave urban centres and rural shtetls in Western

(Footnote continued)

Ageyev and K. Hinton, 'Economic Threat and Authoritarianism in the United States and Russia' (paper presented at the 1995 meeting of the International Society for Political Psychology, Washington, D.C.).

¹⁴ McFarland, Ageyev and Hinton, 'Economic Threat and Authoritarianism in the United States and Russia', p. 28. Similar findings have been reported from research in Western Europe. For instance, Lincoln Quillian, in 'Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe', *American Sociological Review*, 60 (1995), 586–611, p. 606, notes: 'The economic conditions in a country and the size of the racial or immigrant group influence people's views of group relations, and in so doing influence prejudicial attitudes.' He also asserts that 'the link between economic circumstances and prejudice results from either blaming the subordinate group for economic hardship (scapegoating), or from competition with the subordinate group for scarce resources' (p. 590).

¹⁵ Although we cannot test a fully elaborated micro-level model of how this process works, we do have some ideas on this score. Exogenous events (like the demise of the Soviet Union) generate uncertainty, anxiety and perceptions of threat among ordinary citizens. To the extent that authoritarian propensities exist among people, threats mobilize authoritarianism, which in turn feeds back to heightened sensitivity to threat, resulting in intolerance and prejudice. See, for example, Howard Lavine, Milton Lodge, James Polichak and Charles Taber, 'Explicating the Black Box Through Experimentation: Studies of Authoritarianism and Threat', *Political Analysis*, 10 (2002), 342–60; and Stanley Feldman and Karen Stenner, 'Perceived Threat and Authoritarianism', *Political Psychology*, 18 (1997), 741–70. With large-scale societal threats, however, the matter of whom to blame becomes crucial. Governments and other major actors always shirk responsibility for blame, and it is often to the advantage of many to diffuse responsibility for unwelcome changes. It is at this point that anxious and threatened citizens often identify a scapegoat for societal problems. In many societies, and in Russia in particular, readily available scapegoats exist. Political entrepreneurs seek political capital by mobilizing support for repressive and punitive actions against scapegoats. See, for example, Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber and Gallya Lahav, 'Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies', *American Journal of Political Science*, 49 (2005), 610–25.

Russia, and moved to the newly established Pale of Jewish Settlement.¹⁶ The deprivation and economic hardship, exacerbated by mandatory conscription and a spate of anti-Jewish pogroms (most notably the Kishinev Easter pogrom of 1903), stimulated a period of mass emigration of an estimated two million Russian Jews to the United States up until the end of the First World War.¹⁷

Following the Bolshevik Revolution and Lenin's nationalization of the Jewish people, Russian Jews continued to be viewed as scapegoats. The leading roles played by Jews in the socialist enterprise, in notable groups like the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and the Bund, made them particularly easy targets for the Stalinist purges of the 1930s. Irving Horowitz describes this period as an 'unenviable "choice" between liquidation at the hands of the Nazis and denigration at the hands of the Communists'.¹⁸ The notorious murders of Yiddish writers, the Prague trials and the Doctors' Plot were only a few instances of Stalin's attempt to expunge the Soviet Union of 'rootless' Jews until his death in 1953.¹⁹ Throughout the late-Soviet period, state-sponsored anti-Semitism consistently served as a tool to legitimize the denial of emigration visas for Russian Jews. In short, for centuries of Russian history, through different political regimes and social conditions, the 'standing decision' has been that Jews are to blame for Russia's problems, and this presumption has resulted in countless incidents of discrimination, victimization and violence.

It is also indisputable that in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, various individuals and organizations expected violence and repression against Russia's Jews to materialize. Their fears were grounded in part in the repeated scapegoating of Jews at earlier points in Russian history, particularly in times of crisis. Exemplifying this view, in October 1989 the Lithuanian Jewish writer Grigori Kanovich asked how Jews could remain in the Soviet Union 'when leaden pogrom clouds are hanging over our heads ... when the lightning of intolerance and hostility is flashing ominously near and far, when there is an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust all around us? ... We still have no long-term guarantees of an equal and secure existence.'²⁰

This expectation of Jewish victimization was not a fleeting one, and it continued throughout the 1990s. An alarmist article published in *Commentary* closed with a quotation from a Russian Jewish woman that 'sums up the entire dilemma, political and existential, that Jews like her confront in today's Russia'. In her words, 'Russians will have to find scapegoats for disaster, because that's the way we think. Jews will be the obvious scapegoats.'²¹ In its Annual Report, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) stated: 'A growing area of concern for the League in 1998 was Russia. With the economic and political instability in the region, there has been an increase in political anti-Semitism, with elected Communist Party officials spouting outrageous accusations targeting Jews as

¹⁶ Salo W. Baron, *The Russian Jew under Tsars and Soviets* (New York: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 50–76.

¹⁷ For a useful account of both the pogroms and subsequent emigration, see Arnold Margolin, *The Jews of Eastern Europe* (New York: T. Seltzer, 1926).

¹⁸ Irving Horowitz, 'The Totalitarian Collusion', in Ilya Ehrenburg and Vasily Grossman, *The Complete Black Book of Russian Jewry*, trans. and ed. David Patterson (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2002), pp. v–xii, at p. v.

¹⁹ See Louis Rapoport, *Stalin's War Against the Jews: The Doctors' Plot and the Soviet Solution* (New York: Macmillan, 1990).

²⁰ Quoted in Zvi Gitelman, *A Century of Ambivalence: The Jews of Russia and the Soviet Union, 1881 to the Present*, 2nd edn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), p. 244.

²¹ Peter Brodsky [pseudonym], 'Are Russian Jews in Danger?' *Commentary*, 95 (May, 1993), 37–40.

scapegoats for Russia's economic, political and social ills.²² Moreover, Yosef I. Abramowitz, President of the Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union (UCSJ), claimed in 1998 that 'History demonstrates the imminent danger that Jews and other minorities will become scapegoats for the political and economic failures of the Russian authorities.'²³ Thus, during the first post-Soviet decade, many commentators and groups feared that another ignominious chapter in Russia's long history of anti-Jewish victimization was about to open.

Finally, several scholars have expressed similar concerns. For instance, in the early 1990s, the sociologist Robert Brym observed:

In this volatile context [economic and social stress] the question of antisemitism – its level, social distribution, and possible political uses – takes on special significance. Antisemites have often blamed Jews for the ills of their societies. The former Soviet Union has a long tradition of antisemitism and the largest combined number of Jews and people with negative attitudes towards Jews in any region in the world. The potential for casting Jews in their traditional role of scapegoat thus appears large.²⁴

Javeline is also explicit in her fears and expectations. She argues:

If attributing blame for the crisis is difficult, then what might be most appreciated is an outlet for pent-up frustration, and one of the easiest outlets is to scapegoat already unpopular groups, such as Jews, Caucasians, or the West. The accusations need not be accurate or even logical, but if they are simple and clear, they may find a receptive audience. Demagoguery, more than social unrest, is the frightening cloud hanging over Russia.²⁵

Furthermore, Javeline lays out the logic of the scapegoating argument succinctly. She writes:

[Russia] has a history of pogroms and mass deportations of entire ethnic groups 'blamed' for all sorts of political and economic problems ... There are signs that similar scapegoating explanations could find a receptive audience in contemporary Russia or at least that prominent politicians have been exploiting the public's attribution dilemma [not knowing whom to blame] by reducing the problem to uncomplicated racist accusations.²⁶

In sum, in the 1990s, there was widespread agreement, bolstered by Russian history, that conditions were ripe for this scapegoating process to target Russia's Jews.

²² Anti-Defamation League, 'Europe and the Former Soviet Union', in *ADL 1998 Annual Report*, http://www.adl.org/annual_report/1998/inter_europe.asp [accessed 6 July 2005].

²³ Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union (UCSJ), 'Political and Economic Turmoil in Russia Heightens Antisemitic Threats', <http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/082498pr.shtml> (1998) [accessed 6 July 2005].

²⁴ Robert J. Brym, 'The Spread of Antisemitism in Moscow on the Eve of the 1993 Parliamentary Election', *East European Jewish Affairs*, 24 (Summer, 1994), p. 39.

²⁵ Debra Javeline, *Protest and the Politics of Blame: The Russian Response to Unpaid Wages* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2003), p. 224.

²⁶ Javeline, *Protest and the Politics of Blame*, p. 239. We might note that Javeline's analysis also focuses on a 'dog that didn't bark' in the sense that she asks why the wage arrears crisis in Russia did not result in more collective action. Her primary conclusion is that the inability to mobilize is a function of diffuse rather than specific perceptions of who is to blame for the problem.

ANTI-SEMITISM IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA

Attacks on Russian Jews

To what degree were Jews in fact victimized during the 1990s? One way of assessing anti-Jewish actions involves tracking the number of anti-Semitic attacks and violent incidents that have been reported over time. Figure 1 presents data compiled by the Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Anti-Semitism and Racism (SRI), on the number of 'major attacks' and 'major violent incidents' against Jews in Russia per year from 1994 to 2000.²⁷ This measure is incomplete, of course, since it only tabulates the number of *reported* incidents. It is likely that some victims do not report attacks to the authorities – particularly if they do not trust those authorities to take the appropriate action. Nonetheless, victims were probably *more* likely to report incidents over the course of the 1990s, as it became more certain that state-sponsored anti-Semitism really was waning, and as the monitoring systems of organizations like the SRI and ADL became more vigilant. Consequently, the results in Figure 1 are especially striking, since they show that anti-Jewish attacks and violence were relatively rare during the 1990s and that there has been no systematic increase in the number of anti-Semitic attacks or incidents reported.




Fig. 1. Attacks and violence against Jews in Russia

Note: Data unavailable for 'major attacks' in 1997 and for 'violent incidents' in 1995.

²⁷ Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Anti-Semitism and Racism, 'Anti-Semitism Worldwide: Russia'. See <http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/annual-report.html> (accessed 6 July 2005). The ADL also tracks the number of 'violent attacks', but data are only available for a very limited number of years. Note that the ADL studies do not indicate any significant changes over time. See http://www.adl.org/anti_semitism/russia_print.asp (accessed 6 July 2005) and http://www.adl.org/Anti_semitism/as_russia.asp (accessed 6 July 2005). Other organizations, such as the National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ) and the Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union (UCSJ), occasionally refer to figures on attacks in their reports, but these are derived from either the SRI or ADL reports, rather than from original data.

If anti-Semitism really has grown over the course of the 1990s, we find no corroborating evidence in the available behavioural data.

Anti-Semitism Surveys

The issue of Russian anti-Semitism has also attracted the attention of several scholars in the initial wave of survey research conducted in the transitional Soviet Union, but no firm consensus has emerged.²⁸ Of course, one must always be cautious in using surveys to derive point estimates of public opinion on any given issue. If we asked people to respond to a statement like ‘Jews have some undesirable qualities’, the answer would most likely be that anti-Jewish sentiment is extremely widespread; but were we to put a statement like ‘All Jews ought to be forced to leave Russia immediately’ to a sample of Russians, we would likely conclude that anti-Jewish feelings are not very common. The point is simply that the wording of questions – the strength of the stimulus offered to respondents – has, not surprisingly, a great deal to do with the responses given.

Nonetheless, some research based on multiple indicators has discovered that anti-Semitism seemed to be neither widespread nor virulent. For instance, Gibson and Duch conclude that expressed anti-Semitism among residents of the Moscow oblast ‘is more uncommon in Moscow [in 1990] than many (including us) had suspected’.²⁹ Their findings from a comparable survey in 1990 in the European portion of the former Soviet Union support the same conclusion.³⁰ Moreover, based on his analysis of a survey of Russians conducted in 1992, Furman writes: ‘Thus, no mass anti-Semitism was revealed by the survey (our data agree in this regard with the data of other, analogous surveys), and a Jewish pogrom seems less likely than some sort of “Caucasian” pogrom.’³¹

However, alarm bells have been sounded by some. For instance, based on a 1992 survey in eleven Soviet republics, Brym and Degtyarev claim to have discovered ‘a level of animosity against Jews that exceeds black–white animosities in the U.S.’³² Brym is even more concerned that Russian anti-Semitism spread in the early 1990s beyond the confines of its traditional base in politically marginal groups (the less educated, the elderly, the working class). His analysis is based on a Moscow sample in which 17 per cent of the respondents agreed with the sole indicator of anti-Semitism: ‘Do you agree that

²⁸ There is some agreement, however, on the distribution of opinions towards Jews: Brym notes in ‘Russian Antisemitism, 1996–2000’, appearing in Zvi Gitelman, with Musya Glants and Marshall I. Goldman, eds, *Jewish Life After the USSR* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), pp. 99–113, at p. 102: ‘Most surveys [of antisemitism in Russia] show that roughly 15 percent of Russians hold negative opinions about Jews and about a third claim to hold no opinion.’ Similarly, Javeline concedes that ‘public opinion polls have not yet reflected an alarming growth in anti-Semitism in Russia’ (see Javeline, *Protest and the Politics of Blame*, p. 240).

²⁹ James L. Gibson and Raymond M. Duch, ‘Anti-Semitic Attitudes of the Mass Public: Estimates and Explanations Based on a Survey of the Moscow Oblast’, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 56 (1992), 1–28, p. 24.

³⁰ James L. Gibson and Raymond M. Duch, ‘Attitudes Toward Jews and the Soviet Political Culture’, *Journal of the Soviet Nationalities*, 2 (1992), 77–117.

³¹ Dmitrii Furman, ‘The Mass Consciousness of Russian Jews and Anti-Semitism’, *Russian Social Science Review*, 36 (1995), 51–74, p. 55.

³² Robert J. Brym and Andrei Degtyarev, ‘Anti-Semitism in Moscow: Results of an October 1992 Survey’, *Slavic Review*, 52 (1993), 1–12, p. 7. Vicki L. Hesli, Arthur H. Miller and William M. Reisinger vigorously disagree with the portrayal of high levels of anti-Semitism by Brym and Degtyarev in ‘Comment on Brym and Degtyarev’s Discussion of Anti-Semitism in Moscow’, *Slavic Review*, 53 (1994), 836–41, p. 840.

representatives of the Jewish people abuse the rights granted them?'³³ In a later survey, Brym found that '10 per cent of the 1995 respondents accepted completely or somewhat the statement that representatives of the Jewish people harmed Russia' and that '11 per cent of respondents viewed Jews as one of the four biggest dangers facing Russia.'³⁴ He judges these figures to be extremely worrisome (although obviously that judgement can easily be debated). Brym holds perhaps the most alarmist views, but, as shown above, many other organizations and scholars also expected dire conditions to materialize for Russian Jews during the 1990s.

Since the early rounds of survey research on Soviet anti-Semitism, less has been reported about Russian attitudes towards Jews. However, summarizing findings from 1990 through 1997, Gudkov asserts: 'The masses' attitude toward Jews may be generally characterized as marked by a predominance of positive, or at least tolerant, attitudes. Most Russians, especially ethnic Russians, are neutral toward Jews, as they are toward all other ethnic groups in Russia.'³⁵ Moreover, he finds the following percentages of Russians asserting that Jews are mostly to blame for Russia's troubles: 1990, 6 per cent; 1992, 8 per cent, and 1997, 10 per cent.³⁶ In short, as Ryvkina observes,

the level of anti-Semitic attitudes in Russian society is relatively low, and hence it is clear that the 'final solution of the Jewish question' about which today's ideologues of fascism write and which they see in 'purging' Russia of Jews, does not concur with the real attitudes of the vast majority of the country's population.³⁷

Efforts to Foment Anti-Semitism

If anti-Semitism is not widespread in Russia, it is certainly not due to the lack of effort by certain Russian political figures.³⁸ For instance, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (one of the most misnamed parties in Russian politics) has long

³³ Brym, 'The Spread of Anti-Semitism in Moscow', p. 32. Brym has been criticized for employing measures of concepts with low validity. See, for example, James L. Gibson, 'Misunderstandings of Anti-Semitism in Russia: An Analysis of the Politics of Anti-Jewish Attitudes', *Slavic Review*, 52 (1994), 829–35. For instance, Brym believes that xenophobia could be measured in Russia in 1993 by agreement with the statement that Russia is 'threatened by the selling off of its national wealth to foreigners' (see Brym, 'The Spread of Antisemitism in Moscow', p. 33). In one of his initial surveys, he used the following item to represent anti-Semitism: 'Have you ever witnessed the infringement of the rights of a Jew?' One who says 'never' is judged to be an anti-Semite.

³⁴ Robert J. Brym, 'Russian Attitudes Towards Jews: An Update', *East European Jewish Affairs*, 26 (Summer, 1996), 55–64, p. 60.

³⁵ Lev D. Gudkov, 'Parameters of Anti-Semitism: Attitudes Toward Jews in Russia, 1990–97', *Sociological Research*, 38 (July/August, 1999), 72–96, p. 77.

³⁶ Gudkov, 'Parameters of Anti-Semitism', p. 96.

³⁷ Rozalina Ryvkina, 'Jews in Present-Day Russia', *Russian Social Science Review*, 39 (May–June, 1998), 52–68, p. 66.

³⁸ Most theories of inter-group conflict ascribe an important if not crucial role to the instigations of political elites. Political entrepreneurs advance intolerant proposals within the political marketplace in the hopes of attracting support and political capital. See, for example, Jack L. Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: Norton, 2000). Brym argues: 'The fate of Russian Jewry depends less on the level of anti-Jewish sentiments in the general population than on the policies and perceived needs of the people who control the Duma and especially the presidency' (see Brym, 'Russian Antisemitism, 1996–2000', p. 109).

sought to mobilize political support by attacking Jews.³⁹ And over the past few years, an increasing number of politicians – particularly from the Communist Party, which has become fiercely nationalistic⁴⁰ – have openly expressed anti-Semitic sentiments, with the hope of drumming up mass fervour and support. In fact, in the fall of 1998, the openly anti-Semitic provocations of a Communist Party Duma member (and former general), Albert Makashov, created a furore in Russian politics. Makashov's party boss, Gennady Zyuganov, not only refused to condemn these hateful comments, but he supported them by issuing the following statement:

Our people are not blind. They cannot but see that Zionization of the government authorities of Russia was one of the reasons of the present catastrophic conditions of the country, mass impoverishment and dying out of its population. They cannot turn a blind eye to the aggressive, destructive role of Zionist capital in ruining Russia's economy and plundering her property owned by all. There is a growing understanding among the people that the origin of all the current trouble is the criminal course of an anti-people, supra-national oligarchy that seized power.⁴¹

Thus, if Russian public opinion has not turned against Jews, it is certainly not owing to the absence of efforts by prominent political leaders to stir up anti-Jewish sentiment.

While these developments verify that anti-Semitism has certainly not been eradicated from Russian politics and society, it would be both premature and inaccurate to jump to the conclusion that anti-Semitism is rampant and spreading, and that we are perhaps living through a phase that some have called 'Weimar Russia'.⁴² For instance, it appears that the administration of President Vladimir Putin is committed to combating anti-Semitism. Indeed, according to a report from the Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union (UCSJ):

Putin continues to make positive gestures towards Russia's Jewish community by attending major Jewish events, praising the role of Jews in Russia's history and contemporary life, and strongly condemning antisemitism. In many regions, it is no longer uncommon to see a mayor or governor visit a synagogue or congratulate the community on a holiday. These official gestures have helped to create a more confident climate for Jews in Russia, spurring a continued renaissance of Jewish life in Russia, as evidenced by the growing number of synagogues being returned to the community after decades of government ownership, the increasing media coverage of Jewish communal activities and statements by Jewish leaders about domestic and international events, and a rising willingness of Jewish leaders in some parts of the country to stand up publicly for their rights.⁴³

To be sure, even Putin's supporters reserve a healthy dose of scepticism about his

³⁹ Over the years, Zhirinovskiy has made a number of outlandish claims, including that Jews cause wars: 'You will always find Jews where war is raging, because they realize that money flows where blood is spilled' (see Associated Press, 'Russian politician spews anti-Semitic rhetoric again' (9 April 1998)).

⁴⁰ See Veljko Vujacic, 'Gennady Zyuganov and the Third Road', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 12 (April–June, 1996), 118–54.

⁴¹ Quoted in David Hoffman, 'Communist Party chief joins attack on Zionism; Jewish tycoons "ruining" Russia', *Washington Post* (25 December 1998), A42.

⁴² See the careful consideration, and rejection, of this analogy in Stephen E. Hanson and Jeffrey S. Kopstein, 'The Weimar/Russia Comparison', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 13 (July–September, 1997), 252–83.

⁴³ Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union (UCSJ), 'Antisemitism, Xenophobia and Religious Persecution in Russia's Regions, 2001' (Moscow: UCSJ, 2002), pp. 1–2.

motivations and about the situation for Jews in Russia.⁴⁴ For instance, while there are many possible reasons for Putin's stance on the issue of anti-Semitism, one is that Russia has received billions of dollars from the American government.⁴⁵ International pressure has undoubtedly made attacks on Russian Jews politically costly. Yet it is nonetheless undeniable that anti-Semitism is not the official policy of the contemporary government of Russia (as it so often has been in the past).

We certainly agree with those who argue that, given Russia's tortured history, virtually any degree of anti-Semitism is in some sense *too much* anti-Semitism. Nonetheless, a beginning point for any serious understanding of Russia's treatment of its Jews is the assessment of the degree to which anti-Semitic appeals are likely to resonate with members of the mass public. A careful re-examination of Russian anti-Semitism is therefore in order.⁴⁶

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

Most of our analysis is based upon a panel study of the Russian mass public, initiated in 1996, continued in 1998, and concluded in 2000. The overall focus of the survey was on attitudes towards a wide variety of democratic institutions and processes. Two-thirds of the respondents interviewed in 1996 were also queried in 1998 and 2000. Methodological details on the survey can be found in Appendix A.

Within each interview, the respondents had two opportunities to identify themselves as Jewish. First, they were asked their nationality, and, at a later point in the interview, about

⁴⁴ The UCSJ report goes on to observe the following: 'Yet under the veneer of stability and justifiable celebration of the amazing achievements of the past decade, there remains a sense of unease. In part, this feeling is unavoidable no matter what the current circumstances are, given the dark history of antisemitism in Russia and doubts about the country's long term stability and prosperity ... Russian Jews know that they are the favorite scapegoats of many demagogic politicians whose popularity may rise suddenly in the face of another economic collapse like the August 1998 [rouble] crash.' (UCSJ, 'Antisemitism, Xenophobia and Religious Persecution in Russia's Regions, 2001', p. 2.)

⁴⁵ This included \$1.022 billion in 2002 alone (see, for example, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/23625.htm> [accessed 24 June 2005]).

⁴⁶ Some may consider data showing that large numbers of Jews left Russia during the 1990s as evidence that anti-Semitism is widespread and pernicious. However, the decision to emigrate is typically a function of both 'push' and 'pull' factors. While some Jews were surely 'pushed' out of Russia by their perception of anti-Semitism, many others were certainly 'pulled' to Israel, the United States or Germany (the three largest recipients of Jewish immigrants) by the prospects of an overall better life. As Gitelman points out: 'economics may have been driving the migrants as much as anti-Semitism' (see Gitelman, *A Century of Ambivalence*, p. 248). Laqueur agrees. Referring to the 1970s and 1980s, he claims: 'Though many Jews left, this was seldom because of acute anti-Semitism' (see Walter Laqueur, *Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 103). Indeed, it is quite likely that many *non-Jewish* Russians would have emigrated to wealthier countries as well, had they had the opportunity. And for a brief analysis of Russian emigration showing that the number of emigrants declined markedly early in the twenty-first century, see Brym, 'Russian Antisemitism, 1996–2000', p. 110, who argues that 'much of the decline in emigration rates was the direct result of an easing of tensions in Russia itself ... Moreover, Russian-Jewish communal life has flourished, providing an increasingly attractive alternative to emigration for some Russian Jews'. To our knowledge, no comprehensive research has been conducted that differentiates the relative influence of various stimulants to emigration (but, see Robert J. Brym, with the assistance of Rozalina Ryvkina, *The Jews of Moscow, Kiev and Minsk: Identity, Antisemitism, Emigration* (London: Macmillan, 1994), who found that, among Jews in three Russian cities in the early 1990s, 13 per cent of those desiring to emigrate were motivated by 'fear of antisemitism and pogroms', while 59 per cent expressed economic reasons). In general, we are certain that emigration rates are a poor surrogate measure of the extent of anti-group prejudice in the home country.

their religious affiliation. Out of 2,059 respondents, only fifteen claimed at any point during the three interviews to be Jewish by nationality or religion (and this does not require that the respondent be consistent across interviews). Though including these respondents in the analysis that follows would have no effect whatsoever on the statistical results, we have, following convention,⁴⁷ excluded them from our investigation of Russian anti-Semitism.

CHANGE IN AFFECT TOWARDS JEWS, 1990–2000

How have Russian attitudes towards Jews changed over the turbulent 1990s? Table 1 reports general affect towards Jews and three other groups over the period from 1990 to 2000.⁴⁸ The measure reported is simply positive or negative general attitudes towards the group, collected on an 11-point scale (with high scores indicating greater positive affect).⁴⁹ Because the mean scores occasionally obscure important variance, we also report the percentages of respondents expressing any degree of positive affect, any degree of negative affect, and neutral opinions towards the group. Note that our questions explicitly offer neutral and no opinion options to the respondents.⁵⁰ We include four groups in this analysis: (1) Jews, for obvious reasons; (2) believers, since they too are a heterogeneous religious group; (3) Communists, since they symbolize the previous institutional order while also representing the best-organized opposition movement in contemporary Russian politics; and (4) nationalists, since some view nationalist groups as harbouring significant amounts of anti-Semitism and xenophobia.⁵¹

Several conclusions are supported by the data in this table. First, nationalists are quite disliked by Russians, while believers attract a considerable amount of positive affect. Secondly, Russians like Jews and Communists roughly equally, except for a substantial dip in attitudes towards Communists in 1992 (perhaps due to their involvement in the 1991 coup attempt). Thirdly, in general, considerable stability is demonstrated in these data. At least at the aggregate level – and with the exception of Communists – opinions towards these groups seem to change little. Perhaps most importantly, these data reveal only limited movement in attitudes towards Jews over the course of the 1990s. The mean positive affect scores vary from 5.84 in 1990 to 6.09 in 2000, reaching their apogee in 1992 and 1996 (6.31). With standard deviations of roughly 2, this variation is rather minor.

⁴⁷ See, for example, Gibson and Duch, 'Anti-Semitic Attitudes of the Mass Public'.

⁴⁸ The surveys prior to the 1996–2000 panel were conducted by Gibson and his colleagues. They have the advantage of being fielded by the same research team and survey organization as the panel so that a variety of 'house effects' common in survey research (especially in Russia) are held constant and therefore do not affect the substantive conclusions. Numerous articles have been published based on these data (e.g., Gibson and Duch, 'Anti-Semitic Attitudes of the Mass Public').

⁴⁹ The question asked: 'And now I would like to ask how you feel about certain well-known groups of people. On this card there is a scale from 1 to 11. '1' means that you really dislike this group, '11' means that you really like it. '6' means that you feel neither sympathy nor antipathy towards this group. The other numbers on the scale reflect different levels of affinity. How do you feel about [the group]?'

⁵⁰ Anticipating that significant numbers of Russians would select the 'neutral' point on the 11-point scale, we followed-up in 2000 by asking them to explain their lack of positive or negative views towards Jews. We then coded each of the 493 explanations (in Russian) for any evidence of either positive or negative affect towards Jews, discovering only fourteen instances in which any negative affect towards Jews was expressed (e.g., 'They are the same people as we are, only a little more cunning'). The most common responses, by far, to the open-ended question were expressions of indifference in one form or another (e.g., 'I feel the same way as I do about all other peoples'). We can find absolutely nothing in these replies indicating that Russian anti-Semites took refuge in an expression of neutrality towards Jews.

⁵¹ See, for example, Laqueur, *Black Hundred*.

TABLE 1 *Change in Affect Towards Jews and Other Groups, 1990–2000, Russia*

	Year of survey				
	1990	1992	1996	1998	2000
<i>Jews</i>					
Mean	5.84	6.31	6.31	6.15	6.09
Standard Deviation	2.06	2.24	2.14	1.96	2.33
N	680	2,525	1,316	1,312	1,310
% Negative Affect	17.6	17.6	12.6	12.9	24.0
% Neutral	69.8	54.4	64.9	68.9	47.4
% Positive Affect	12.6	28.0	22.5	18.2	28.6
<i>Believers</i>					
Mean	7.61	7.79	7.69	7.68	7.80
Standard Deviation	2.55	2.43	2.35	2.36	2.37
N	680	2,531	1,321	1,309	1,320
% Negative Affect	6.1	8.2	5.7	6.2	7.3
% Neutral	48.9	35.3	41.1	40.1	34.3
% Positive Affect	45.0	56.5	53.3	53.7	58.4
<i>Communists</i>					
Mean	6.88	4.73	6.04	6.41	6.32
Standard Deviation	2.99	2.72	3.37	3.07	3.06
N	680	2,517	1,319	1,319	1,319
% Negative Affect	20.8	47.6	34.0	28.5	34.6
% Neutral	35.2	36.6	30.0	33.4	26.0
% Positive Affect	43.9	15.8	36.0	38.1	39.4
<i>Nationalists</i>					
Mean	2.37	2.55	3.17	2.98	2.86
Standard Deviation	2.2	2.17	2.48	2.34	2.31
N	680	2,514	1,301	1,314	1,317
% Negative Affect	79.4	79.7	67.4	71.4	76.2
% Neutral	17.7	18.1	28.7	25.0	19.8
% Positive Affect	2.9	2.2	3.9	3.6	4.1

To what degree are levels of anti-Jewish sentiment among Russians connected to the turmoil of the Russian political and economic transformation? With only five data points on affect towards Jews, this question resists easy answers. We can, however, place these results within the context of a Russian time series based on a simple question asking about whether the country is heading in the right or wrong direction. Figure 2, compiled from survey data collected by the US Department of State, reports these percentages, based on eighteen surveys.⁵² We have added to this figure two additional indicators: the percentage of respondents expressing positive attitudes towards Jews and the percentage with negative views (based on the data presented in Table 1).

One can see in these data a dramatic increase in the percentage of Russians judging their country to be moving in the wrong direction, peaking at 84 per cent in October 1998

⁵² US Department of State, Office of Research, 'Opinion Analysis: Putin Half Fills the Russian Glass', No. M-8-02 (28 January 2002), Washington, D.C.




Fig. 2. Change in Russian views about where the country is heading and anti-Jewish affect

(shortly after the August 1998 rouble default). Since that time, however, this percentage has eroded just as dramatically, and by October 2001 the proportion of Russians viewing their country as moving in the right direction exceeded that asserting that the wrong direction is still being pursued. The growth in Russian optimism is stunning.

Evidence that attitudes towards Jews covary in any significant way with perceptions of where the country is heading is difficult to discern. Consider the period surrounding the rouble default, perceived then as a major economic catastrophe for Russia. Shortly after the default, Russian opinion turned more positive about the direction of the country, and positive affect towards Jews increased. *But so too did negative affect.* Optimism about Russia's political and economic future seems to be associated with a growth in negative, as well as positive, sentiments towards Jews. Clearly there is little evidence in this time series that expressed attitudes towards Jews are synchronized with economic and political stress in Russia.

Changes in attitudes in the 1996–2000 period deserve more careful consideration, since the affect means do not describe the distribution of opinion particularly well. Two trends are apparent in the responses in Table 1. First, anti-Jewish feelings increased from – 12.6 per cent to – 24.0 per cent. Nearly all of this change seems to have been between the 1998 and 2000 interviews. At the same time, however, positive affect grew somewhat, although not as dramatically or as consistently across the three interviews. In 1996, 22.5 per cent of the respondents expressed some degree of positive affect towards Jews; the figure dipped slightly in 1998 to 18.2 per cent; and in 2000, this percentage climbed to 28.6 per cent. Given these counterbalancing trends of positive and negative affect, it is not surprising that the mean score of attitudes towards Jews fluctuated only slightly. This of course implies that neutral attitudes towards Jews diminished over the course of the panel, and in fact between 1998 and 2000, we observed a 20 percentage point decline in those expressing

TABLE 2 *Individual-Level Change in Affect Towards Jews*

Nature of the change	Change between dates		
	1996–98	1998–2000	1996–2000
Significantly more negative	16.2	16.1	19.7
Slightly more negative	8.7	14.7	13.8
No change	52.5	41.2	37.8
Slightly more positive	10.0	14.4	15.4
Significantly more positive	12.6	13.6	13.4
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N	1,301	1,295	1,371

neither positive nor negative attitudes towards Jews (from 68.9 per cent to 47.4 per cent).⁵³ Between 1996 and 2000, and especially between 1998 and 2000, attitudes towards Jews seem to have become more polarized, a finding worthy of closer scrutiny.

Since these are true panel data, we consider in Table 2 a measure of individual-level change in attitudes towards Jews. We have created a variable based on the following categorization of the difference in affect scores expressed in each of the surveys:

Significant change: Change in affect by at least 3 points on the 11-point scale.

Slight change: Change in affect of only 1 or 2 points on the scale.

No change: Exactly the same response given at both points in time.

Consider first change over the period 1996 to 2000 (the last column in the table). During the four years between the first and last interviews nearly 20 per cent of the respondents become significantly more negative towards Jews. A smaller but not trivial number (13.4 per cent) became significantly more positive towards Jews. Another 13.8 per cent of the respondents expressed slightly more negative attitudes in 2000 than in 1996. Putting these figures together, one-third of the respondents (33.5 per cent) became at least slightly more negative towards Jews over the course of the panel survey.⁵⁴ However, this figure is nearly balanced by the 28.8 per cent who became more positive, and 37.8 per cent experienced little change in their expressed affect towards Jews. Thus, opinion polarized.

So we see, at the aggregate level, that feelings among Russians towards Jews have changed little over the course of the 1990s, and there is little in the time series suggesting that anti-Jewish sentiment waxed and waned with economic and political despair. At the

⁵³ Furthermore, note that in every instance, there is a decline from 1998 to 2000 in the percentages of respondents expressing neutral views towards these groups. None of these is as large as the decline in the Jewish percentages, but it seems to us that there is some common process at work here across all of these items. Perhaps having been interviewed twice before had some effect on the responses in the third interview, making people less likely in 2000 to claim neutrality or that they do not hold an opinion towards these groups (although this is not entirely likely given the length of time between the interviews).

⁵⁴ It is unclear to us how much substantive attention should be given to small changes in the responses across interviews separated by about two years. Random measurement error could easily account for a difference of a point or two on the 11-point scale. Another way to look at these data is as follows: 39.2 per cent of those expressing negative attitudes towards Jews in 1996 also held negative attitudes in 2000; 23.7 per cent of those neutral towards Jews in 1996 changed to a negative viewpoint in 2000; and only 16.0 per cent of those who were positively oriented in 1996 were negatively oriented in 2000.

level of the individual citizen, however, the data suggest that, for roughly two-thirds of Russians, levels of affect towards Jews remained constant or actually became more positive. From 1990 to 2000, the percentage of Russians expressing any negative affect towards Jews grew by 6.4 percentage points, but that was counteracted by an increase of 16.0 percentage points for those with positive feelings towards Jews.

We return to the important finding of opinion polarization between the 1998 and 2000 interviews. What accounts for the rather large decline in the percentage of Russians expressing neutrality towards Jews? We suspect that several factors may be at work here, the most important of which was probably the wide publicity and extended discussion ignited by the aforementioned statements by Makashov and Zyuganov.⁵⁵ Indeed, it is quite possible that a number of previously neutral Russians were persuaded by Makashov's and Zyuganov's powerful anti-Semitic diatribes, thus forming negative attitudes towards Jews.⁵⁶ But just as importantly, this rise of negative affect may have actually stimulated the observed increase in positive feelings as well, since some Russians most likely reacted to attacks on Jews by becoming more supportive of their Jewish fellow citizens. It is also possible that the economic crash of August 1998 increased the hostility of ordinary Russians towards the so-called 'oligarchs' – the seven or eight extremely wealthy and influential businessmen who made their vast fortunes from the shady privatization of formerly state-owned industries – most of whom are either Jewish or of partly Jewish origin.⁵⁷

In terms of scapegoat theory, even if one were to interpret the polarization of the late-1990s as evidence of rising anti-Semitism, it took place at a time when Russia's economic situation, along with the general optimism of the population (as seen on Figure 2) were improving considerably. Indeed, scapegoat theory predicts that anti-Semitism would increase when economic conditions worsen, not when they finally start to improve. In other words, however interpreted, the relative polarization shown between 1998 and 2000 in our survey lends only the most limited support to scapegoat theory, at best. In addition, this finding requires that we look more carefully at the nature of anti-Jewish prejudice in the 2000 sample.

⁵⁵ Brym, in 'Russian Antisemitism, 1996–2000', also considers the effect of the Makashov affair on Russian attitudes towards Jews. Unfortunately, however, his analysis of Russian opinion after the Makashov's speech is confined to that portion of the sample who claimed to have heard about the speeches, and that proportion is not reported in his paper. We therefore find it difficult to draw conclusions from his analysis.

⁵⁶ It is reasonable to hypothesize that the rise of anti-Jewish sentiment is most common among supporters of the Communist Party, but our data suggest otherwise. We calculated a simple measure of change in affect towards Jews from 1998 to 2000, and correlated that indicator with affect towards the Communist Party in 1998. The correlation is 0.03, which is statistically and substantively insignificant (nor is there any correlation whatsoever between affect towards Jews and feelings towards Zhirinovskiy). It is interesting to note, however, that the strongest correlation between change in affect towards Jews and feelings towards political groups in Russia is 0.08 – those expressing more sympathy towards *Stalinists* are more likely (slightly) to have become more anti-Jewish between 1998 and 2000. Still, a coefficient of 0.08 borders on being entirely trivial.

⁵⁷ It is worth noting that despite the attempts by some anti-Semitic demagogues to establish a strong link between the oligarchs and their Jewishness, these efforts have failed to mobilize significant political support, and the unpopularity of the oligarchs seems to be largely a function of their actions and wealth, rather than their religious affiliation. See, for example, Susan B. Glasser, 'Lonely at the top for Russia's billionaires: Already unpopular among the public, "Oligarchs" become election-year target', *Washington Post* (23 October 2003), p. 21.

CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN ANTI-SEMITIC PREJUDICE

We pursued two approaches in this research to measuring Russian attitudes towards Jews. As we have just seen, the first strategy involves a rough indicator of affect towards Jews, asked in surveys over the course of the entire decade. The second set of measures, asked only in 2000, represents statements of antipathy towards and stereotyping of Jews.⁵⁸ We refer to this as 'anti-Semitic prejudice' and begin our cross-sectional analysis of the scapegoating hypothesis with a consideration of these results.

TABLE 3 *Measures of Russian Anti-Semitic Prejudice, 2000*

Proposition	Responses (%)*			Mean	Std. dev.	N	Factor loading
	Disagree	Uncertain	Agree				
Better if Jews left Russia	57.0	29.4	13.6	2.48	0.93	1,375	0.79
Punish Jews for killing Christ	58.2	32.4	9.4	2.35	0.91	1,354	0.58
Jews responsible for problems	63.5	27.2	9.4	2.32	0.89	1,375	0.54
Jews will choose money	19.9	41.9	38.3	3.25	0.86	1,370	0.40

Note: Jewish respondents have been excluded from this table. The propositions read:

'It would be better if every Jew would leave our country.'

'Jews deserve to be punished because they killed Christ.'

'Jews are more responsible than others for the problems that stand before our country today.'

'When it comes to choosing between people and money, Jews will choose money.'

*The values shown are percentages calculated on the basis of collapsing the five-point Likert response set (e.g., 'agree strongly' and 'agree' responses are combined), and total across the three columns to 100 per cent (except for rounding errors). The means and standard deviations are derived from the uncollapsed distributions (ranging from 1 to 5). Higher mean scores indicate more anti-Semitic prejudice.

According to the data in Table 3, 13.6 per cent of the sample believes that Russia would be better off if Jews left the country, and less than 10 per cent assert that Jews should be punished for the alleged actions of their forebear, or that Jews are especially responsible for Russia's problems.⁵⁹ The item drawing the widest anti-Semitic response states that Jews prefer money to people: nearly four out of ten Russians (38.3 per cent) agreed, while only 19.9 per cent disagreed (a plurality, 41.9 per cent, was uncertain about their view on this proposition).⁶⁰ It is noteworthy that a clear majority rejects the anti-Semitic slander

⁵⁸ These questions were used in earlier surveys in Russia. See, for example Gibson and Duch, 'Anti-Semitic Attitudes of the Mass Public'; Gibson and Duch, 'Attitudes Toward Jews and the Soviet Political Culture'; and Gibson, 'Understandings of Anti-Semitism in Russia'. Note that they were not asked in the 1996 and 1998 panel interviews.

⁵⁹ Unfortunately, so much variability exists in survey methodology in Russia that comparison of research findings is often difficult. For instance, some researchers accept the traditional Russian practice of allowing the respondents to self-administer questionnaires, handed to them by the interviewer (e.g., VTsIOM, as reported by Gudkov, 'Parameters of Anti-Semitism'). Samples are not always representative of the entire country (e.g., rural areas are omitted), and researchers differ substantially on whether to allow or encourage the respondents to give 'don't know' replies. Nonetheless, as discussed above, the question about whether Jews are responsible for Russia's problems has been asked (in varying question wording and formats) in several surveys, with the usual finding that only small percentages of Russians attribute the country's misfortunes to Jews. See, for instance, the findings of Robert Brym in 'Russian Attitudes Towards Jews' and the surveys discussed earlier in this article.

⁶⁰ We have no evidence from the survey regarding whether the respondents view this as a negative attribution or criticism of Jewish people, even though the statement was designed as such.

in three of the four measures, with nearly two-thirds of the Russians repudiating the view that Jews more than others are responsible for the country's problems. Thus, anti-Semitic prejudice does not seem to be as widespread in contemporary Russia as might be expected in light of the country's history of ill-treatment of Jews.⁶¹

'Don't know' or 'Uncertain' responses often characterize Russian survey data,⁶² and these data are no exception. Some observers believe that 'Don't know' responses are teaming with anti-Semites who are afraid to express openly their views towards Jews. We doubt strongly that this is true in Russia (see, for example, footnote 50, above), and take comfort from the fact that only a trivial relationship exists between the number of 'Don't know' responses to the prejudice questions and simple affect towards Jews ($r = 0.09$, significant at $p = 0.009$). Those holding more negative feelings in general towards Jews do not tend to give more 'Don't know' replies.⁶³ These measures thus appear to be both valid and reliable. And it is important to emphasize that, if social desirability pressures preclude expressions of anti-Semitism in contemporary Russia, then the contours of acceptable opinions towards Jews have changed dramatically from the past.

These four items were also asked in a 1992 survey in Russia reported in Gibson.⁶⁴ A comparison of the results in our Table 3 with those from the earlier survey produces the following conclusions: (1) in no instance did expressed anti-Semitism increase by more than 4.3 percentage points, and the average change was 1.7 percentage points; (2) expressed 'pro-Jewish' sentiment changed little for two of the four items; and (3) for the other two items, the percentage of respondents expressing uncertainty rose significantly, at the expense of 'pro-Jewish' replies. For instance, the percentage of Russians *disagreeing* that Jews are responsible for Russia's problems fell from 74.5 per cent in 1992 to 63.5 per cent in 2000 (while the percentage agreeing rose from 6.4 to 9.4 per cent). These are obviously not panel data, so caution must be exercised in drawing conclusions about change (for example, most of the differences are within the sampling errors of the two surveys). The safest general conclusion is that no clear evidence of a significant increase in anti-Jewish prejudice between 1992 and 2000 can be found in these data.

⁶¹ This set of items has reasonably good psychometric properties. Internal consistency is acceptable, as indicated by a Cronbach's alpha of 0.67 (and an average inter-item correlation of 0.33, which is substantial for survey data). When factor analysed, these indicators produce a strongly unidimensional solution (with an eigenvalue for the second extracted factor of only 0.83). The pool of items suffers a bit from lack of variance, which simply reflects the fact that anti-Semitic prejudice is not particularly widespread in contemporary Russia. The factor analysis loadings (also reported in Table 3) reveal that the most valid indicator of anti-Jewish prejudice within this set is the general statement that it would be better if Jews left Russia; the least useful measure is the proposition that Jews are excessively concerned with money. The factor score will serve as our measure of anti-Jewish prejudice (although the correlation between the factor score and a simple summated index of the responses to the four items is 0.96).

⁶² See Gibson, 'Understandings of Anti-Semitism in Russia'; Ellen Carnaghan, 'Alienation, Apathy, or Ambivalence? "Don't Knows" and Democracy in Russia', *Slavic Review*, 55 (Summer, 1996), 1–12.

⁶³ The average affect score of those giving two, three or four 'Don't know' responses is 5.8, 5.8 and 5.9, respectively. A slight difference does exist between those giving a single 'Don't know' response (mean = 6.1) and those giving more than one, but generally the relationship between affect and the expression of no opinion towards Jews is so weak ($r = -0.08$) that we conclude that the problem of social desirability does not seriously infect these data. Appendix C presents a much more comprehensive analysis of the problem of response bias.

⁶⁴ Gibson, 'Understandings of Anti-Semitism in Russia', p. 797. These items were also part of the Moscow Oblast survey reported in Gibson and Duch, 'Anti-Semitic Attitudes of the Mass Public', and a survey of the European portion of Russia (as described in the same Gibson and Duch article). Since these two studies are not nationally representative surveys, and since they report results extremely similar to the Russian figures for 1992, we offer no further discussion of those surveys.




Fig. 3. The relationship between general affect towards Jews and acceptance of anti-Jewish prejudice

The Relationship Between General Affect and Prejudice

The correlation of the factor score from this factor analysis and simple affect towards Jews is a highly robust -0.48 : Those expressing warm feelings towards Jews are much less likely to subscribe to anti-Semitism. Figure 3 reports this relationship. From a score of about 5 on the affect scale (indicating slight negative affect) through 11 (high positive affect), expressions of anti-Semitic prejudice are uncommon.

We do not doubt that our index of anti-Jewish prejudice is a more useful measure of attitudes towards Jews than the simple affect scale. The former is more reliable, if only by virtue of being a multiple-item measure, and the affect measure is less discriminating and is likely to suffer from measurement error due to the large number of people scored at the midpoint of the scale (neutral or indifferent). Thus, the most useful analytical strategy is to use the anti-Jewish prejudice index in our examination of cross-sectional variance in attitudes towards Jews.

ACCOUNTING FOR VARIABILITY IN RUSSIAN ANTI-SEMITISM

As we have noted, a prominent explanation of anti-Semitism can be found in processes of scapegoating. This theory asserts that those who hold negative attitudes towards Jews are often reacting to a decline, or a perceived decline, in their status (economic, social and/or political). Changing fortunes typically require an explanation; explanations grounded in dark forces and conspiracies often tempt, since they are so difficult to disprove. We therefore employ three constructs to test scapegoat theory in Russia:

Psychological Predispositions: The theory posits that individuals differ in the degree to which they are predisposed to view the world as made up of 'good' and 'evil'. This tendency towards dogmatism (or authoritarianism) is often said to be an enduring attribute

of the Russian psyche.⁶⁵ The hypothesis is therefore that individuals tending to judge the world in rigid, dichotomous terms are more likely to express anti-Jewish sentiment. This attitude is measured through a variant of a widely used dogmatism scale.⁶⁶

Attitudes other than dogmatism may be important for stimulating anti-Jewish prejudice. In particular, we consider the hypotheses that prejudice stems from: (1) xenophobia – the tendency to fear that which is different;⁶⁷ (2) social conventionalism and deference to authority;⁶⁸ and (3) alienation (or anomie).⁶⁹

A Threatening Catalyst: Under conditions of socio-political tranquility, authoritarian predispositions may lie dormant. But when times turn tough, predispositions may be provoked or activated, causing individuals to pay more attention to the world, and to make more alarmed and anxious judgements about it. Economic disappointment has traditionally been considered to be a vital catalyst stimulating anti-Semitism, and we employ such a measure here, using the standard battery of economic perceptions (sociotropic/egocentric, retrospective/prospective). We also have developed analogous measures of judgements of the performance of the *political* system,⁷⁰ under the hypothesis that prejudice will be more widespread when turmoil in politics is perceived.

Vulnerability: Other feelings of vulnerability and marginality may be influential as well. Individuals who are especially susceptible to threatening changes in their environments have little ability to adapt to evolving demands and circumstances. In the Russian case, many feel particularly ill-prepared to participate in the emerging market economy. We therefore consider the hypothesis that such feelings are associated with anti-Semitism.

Measures of these various independent variables are discussed in Appendix B. For ease of interpretation, all of the indicators have been standardized on a 0 to 1 scale. Table 4 reports the results from regressing anti-Semitic prejudice on the psychological predispositions, the measure of perceived economic marginality and vulnerability, and the standard battery of prospective and retrospective economic and political perceptions. The expected signs for the coefficients for the attitudinal variables are positive; for the perceptual variables, the theory predicts negative signs (perceiving economic and political improvement should be associated with lower levels of prejudice).

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the coefficients in Model I is the extremely weak relationships between economic perceptions and anti-Jewish attitudes. Only retrospective sociotropic perceptions have any direct influence on prejudice, and, contrary to the hypothesis, those who perceive the country's economy to have improved are slightly (but only slightly) *more likely* to express prejudice.⁷¹ Nor are the effects of economic

⁶⁵ See, for example, Archie Brown, *Soviet Politics and Political Science* (London: Macmillan, 1974); Stephen White, *Political and Soviet Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1979).

⁶⁶ See Milton Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind* (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

⁶⁷ C. Robert Cloninger, Dragan M. Svrakic and Thomas R. Przybeck, 'A Psychobiological Model of Temperament and Character', *Archives of General Psychiatry*, 50 (1993), 975–90.

⁶⁸ James L. Gibson, Raymond M. Duch and Kent L. Tedin, 'Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union', *Journal of Politics*, 54 (1992), 329–71.

⁶⁹ See Cloninger, Svrakic and Przybeck, 'A Psychobiological Model of Temperament and Character'.

⁷⁰ See James L. Gibson, 'The Russian Dance with Democracy', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 17 (2001), 101–128.

⁷¹ When we regress prejudice on a nominalized version of retrospective sociotropic economic perceptions (with no change as the excluded category), we find only a single statistically significant coefficient: those perceiving a great deal of *improvement* in Russia's economy are substantially *more likely* to express prejudice ($\beta = 0.16$, $p < 0.000$). Those who judge the economy to have become much worse hold prejudice attitudes that are indistinguishable from those of people perceiving no change in the economy.

TABLE 4 *Cross-Sectional Determinants of Anti-Jewish Prejudice*

Variable	Model I				Model II		
	<i>r</i>	<i>b</i>	s.e.	β	<i>b</i>	s.e.	β
Dogmatism	0.30	0.28	0.03	0.23***	0.27	0.03	0.23***
Alienation	0.13	-0.03	0.03	-0.03			
Social Conservatism	0.15	0.09	0.03	0.09***	0.09	0.03	0.09***
Xenophobia	0.28	0.16	0.02	0.19***	0.16	0.02	0.19***
Economic Marginality	0.13	0.02	0.02	0.03			
Retrospective							
Sociotropic – Economic	0.13	0.06	0.03	0.07*	0.08	0.02	0.09***
Prospective							
Sociotropic – Economic	-0.14	-0.01	0.03	-0.01			
Retrospective							
Egocentric – Economic	-0.07	0.00	0.02	0.00			
Prospective							
Egocentric – Economic	-0.13	-0.02	0.03	-0.03			
Retrospective							
Sociotropic – Political	-0.15	-0.04	0.03	-0.04			
Prospective							
Sociotropic – Political	-0.21	-0.11	0.03	-0.11***	-0.16	0.03	-0.14***
Retrospective							
Egocentric – Political	-0.07	-0.05	0.03	-0.04			
Prospective							
Egocentric – Political	-0.06	-0.02	0.05	-0.01			
Intercept				0.24	0.05	0.17	0.03
R^2				0.18***			0.17***
Standard deviation –							
dependent variable		0.17			0.17		
Standard error of estimate		0.16			0.16		
<i>N</i>		1,290			1,290		

*** $p < 0.001$ ** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$

perceptions filtered through the belief that one is marginal in the contemporary Russian economy, since that variable has no influence whatsoever on prejudice.⁷²

Political perceptions fare little better, although one significant relationship (prospective sociotropic perceptions) is in fact in the expected direction: prejudice is more common among those who expect the political situation in the country to deteriorate.⁷³ Perhaps the

⁷² Additional analysis reveals that we have not diluted the effects of economic and political perceptions by using eight perceptions as separate variables in the equations. The part coefficient (change in R^2) for the *set* of economic perceptions is a mere 0.006 ($p > 0.05$); for the *set* of political perceptions, the part coefficient is statistically significant but quite small (0.015). Moreover, in an interesting paper also based on panel data, Evans and Andersen argue that cross-sectional analyses such as this actually *overstate* the importance of economic considerations (in their case, on voting). See Geoffrey Evans and Robert Andersen, 'The Political Conditioning of Economic Perceptions', *Journal of Politics*, 68 (2006), 194–207. Thus, the effects we observe here most likely represent the maximum possible influence of economic considerations on attitudes.

⁷³ Regressing prejudice on a nominalized version of prospective sociotropic political perceptions reveals several statistically significant coefficients. Prejudice is slightly more common (as compared to those who perceive no change) among those believing the political system has become much worse ($\beta = 0.09$, $p = 0.001$, and a little

most appropriate conclusion to be drawn from these various data is that perceptions of one's own circumstances – political or economic, in comparison to the past or the future – have little to do with holding anti-Jewish attitudes in Russia.⁷⁴

Since many of the null hypotheses tested by the data in Table 4 cannot be rejected, we have estimated a trimmed equation by focusing only on those variables found in Model I to have a significant relationship with prejudice. These results are reported in Model II (the trimmed model).

Anti-Jewish prejudice is closely related to dogmatism and xenophobia. It is noteworthy that these two variables are not redundant – both closedmindedness and fear of that which is different have *independent* direct effects on prejudice. These data show that Russian prejudice is an extension of basic personality attributes, just as is often true of people living in the West.⁷⁵

In addition to the two primary personality influences, social conventionalism has a weak but statistically significant effect on prejudice. Those who are especially deferential to the status quo are more likely to hold anti-Jewish attitudes. Alienation, however, has no consequences for prejudice (see Model I). The trimmed model reproduces the two perceptual coefficients found in the full model for prospective sociotropic political perceptions (with the sign in the expected direction) and retrospective sociotropic economic perceptions (with the sign in the wrong direction).

The general findings of this portion of our analysis are that prejudice stems from personality attributes and is little influenced by perceived deterioration of the political or economic situations in Russia. These conclusions are inconsistent with scapegoat theory in the sense that perceptions of stress and decline do not exacerbate anti-Jewish prejudice; instead, prejudice is rooted in individual personalities.⁷⁶

(F'note continued)

worse ($\beta = 0.06, p = 0.02$). Prejudice is less common among those who expect the political system to improve a little ($\beta = -0.19, p = 0.000$), but only slightly so among those expecting a great deal of improvement in the political system ($\beta = -0.05, p = 0.05$). Those who cannot predict the future are indistinguishable from those who explicitly 'Don't know' how the political system will fare.

⁷⁴ We considered whether a variety of conventional background variables adds anything to the analysis reported in Table 4. We discovered that the following variables had no direct influence on anti-Jewish prejudice and therefore we have excluded them from further consideration: gender, whether the respondent is a self-proclaimed opinion leader, religiosity, whether the respondent is unemployed and whether the respondent is a resident of Moscow or St Petersburg. This leaves three variables with a significant bivariate relationship with anti-Jewish attitudes: level of education, age and whether the respondent does not work. When these variables were added to the equation reported in Table 4 in the article, none was found to have any substantial direct effect on anti-Jewish attitudes (i.e., none of the standardized regression coefficients exceeded 0.10). We found this result unsurprising in that we expected that the effects of these variables would be mediated through the other attitudinal variables reported in Table 4.

⁷⁵ See, for example, Altemeyer, *Enemies of Freedom*.

⁷⁶ Another approach to measuring perceptions of distress is to use an indicator of *disappointment*. Since expectations of the future were measured in 1998 and perceptions of the past were measured in 2000, we can test the hypothesis that those more disappointed (in 2000) were more likely to harbour anti-Jewish sentiments. We constructed separate disappointment variables for sociotropic and egocentric economic expectations. The evidence is that greater disappointment is associated with *less* prejudice, although only weakly for sociotropic attitudes ($\beta = -0.10, p < 0.000$) and not significantly for egocentric attitudes ($\beta = -0.02, n.s.$). Furthermore, the correlation between anti-Semitic prejudice and a summary index of economic and political pessimism is only 0.12, and within a multivariate model with the attitudinal variables, $\beta = 0.09$, which is statistically significant but quite small. No matter how perceptions of the environment are parsed, scapegoat theory receives precious little support from these data.

Non-Linear Cross-Sectional Effects

Careful reflection on scapegoat theory suggests that not all effects of perceptions will be direct.⁷⁷ As we noted above, obdurate personality factors may interact with contemporary influences such that threats from the environment mobilize latent propensities towards intolerance. Consequently, those who are dogmatic and xenophobic but who do not perceive economic and political conditions as deteriorating are unlikely to target Jews with prejudice, just as those who sense turmoil but who are not dogmatic and xenophobic are unlikely to express anti-Semitism. It is the *interaction* of predispositions and perceived decline that is potentially pernicious.

To test this hypothesis, we created a single summary index of both xenophobia and dogmatism.⁷⁸ We then regressed prejudice on the perceived economic marginality indicator and the eight measures of economic and political conditions. According to the theory, the responsiveness of prejudice to these perceptions should grow with increasing closedmindedness and xenophobia. Thus, the expectation is that the explained variance in prejudice will rise with more of this personality characteristic.⁷⁹

This hypothesis must be resoundingly rejected. Consider the test of the null hypothesis that R^2 is indistinguishable from zero: the significance levels for the R^2 s from low to high on the personality index are: n.s., 0.000, 0.025, 0.000, n.s., 0.05, n.s., and n.s.⁸⁰ No linear or monotonic relationship between the level of explained variance and the personality measure exists in these data. Thus, no evidence whatsoever can be found for the hypothesis that attitudes towards Jews are shaped more by perceptions of economic or political distress when accompanied by higher levels of dogmatism and xenophobia.⁸¹

Summary

Our analysis has covered an unusually broad range of data, so a summary of our conclusions is in order.

- Anti-Jewish attitudes are not as common in Russia as we expected on the basis of our understanding of Russia's historical stance towards Jews.
- Nor do prejudice and negative affect towards Jews seem to have increased very much over the course of the turbulent 1990s.

⁷⁷ See, for example, Feldman and Stenner, 'Perceived Threat and Authoritarianism'.

⁷⁸ The variable counts the number of xenophobic or dogmatic replies (0–7) to our queries.

⁷⁹ This analysis is a direct test of the interactive hypothesis, even if some may not recognize it as such. We hypothesize that the *impact* of perceived conditions on prejudice will increase as closedmindedness/xenophobia increases. Thus, the hypothesis directly concerns the level of explained variance ('impact'), which is represented by R^2 . We report the interactive analysis in this fashion so as to simplify what is a complex equation involving eight independent variables, the personality measure and the interactions between the personality measure and each of the eight independent variables.

⁸⁰ The largest adjusted (and unadjusted) R^2 is for the thirteen respondents giving dogmatic or xenophobic responses to all of these items (but the coefficient is not significant); however, the second largest R^2 is from the 228 Russians expressing dogmatism or xenophobia only *once* (significant at 0.000).

⁸¹ The obverse of this formulation of the conditional hypothesis is that the role of personality characteristics in shaping prejudice will increase as perceptions of malaise increase. To formalize this relationship, we estimated a conditional equation, using a dichotomous measure of pessimism as both a linear term and in multiplicative variables interacting with the personality indicators. The interactive effects of dogmatism, xenophobia and economic marginality fail to achieve statistical significance. We therefore conclude that the activation of these psychological characteristics is *not* dependent upon stimulation from the environment.

- In general, perceptions of economic and political stress in society have little impact on attitudes towards Jews.
- Instead, anti-Jewish prejudice stems from a complex of attitudes typically associated with authoritarianism, just as in the West.
- We find little support for scapegoat theory in this analysis. Even when the attitudes are in place, perceptions of economic and political distress only marginally contribute to anti-Jewish feelings.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS: THE RATIONALITY OF PREJUDICE?

Based on a 1995 survey of Russians, Brym proclaimed:

The real danger seems to lie in the possibility of certain political parties and leaders exacerbating anti-Jewish sentiment, using it to enhance their popularity and power, and deflecting attention from Russia's real problems by encouraging increased social, occupational and political discrimination against Jews – in short, a reversion to a sort of Brezhnev-era antisemitism.⁸²

Few serious observers of Russian politics would agree that this predicted danger in fact materialized in the latter part of the 1990s. What happened?

The failure of pernicious anti-Semitism to materialize in Russia is not for want of effort among certain segments of the Russian elite. As we have shown above, powerful political leaders in Russia have sought political capital with appeals to anti-Jewish sentiment in the country. And indeed, the fact that most of the much-hated oligarchs are Jewish has added the 'kernel of truth' upon which scapegoating often relies.⁸³ The payoffs to such gambits have been relatively small, however, thus encouraging enterprising elites to pursue alternative strategies for generating mass support and political capital. Somehow, despite extremely propitious circumstances – economic collapse, political turmoil, and an ideological vacuum, with historical precedents of pogroms and the recent memory of state-sponsored anti-Semitic acrimony – anti-Jewish hostility and violence in Russia did not materialize in the way that scapegoat theory would predict, and that many observers had in fact expected.

Why? Why didn't the Russians respond, as they have often responded to anti-Jewish exhortations throughout history? At least one part of the answer is that not enough Russians are predisposed to believe scurrilous allegations against Jews. Like the 'race card' in American politics,⁸⁴ if racist predispositions are not sufficiently widespread, then the limited response to proffers of racist appeals generates few political benefits. Thus, in some sense our understanding of this problem does indeed rely upon the conclusion that anti-Semitism in Russia is not widespread enough to be mobilized successfully in electoral politics.

In addition, the efforts of some Russian elites to check any growth in anti-Semitism should not be discounted. When Putin, for instance, visits a synagogue, a strong symbolic message is presented to the Russian people, encouraging intergroup tolerance.⁸⁵ Our

⁸² Brym, 'Russian Attitudes Towards Jews', p. 63.

⁸³ See Gordon Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954).

⁸⁴ See, for example, Tali Mendelberg, *The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norms of Equality* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).

⁸⁵ As Iyengar and Simon observe, the image of President Ford attempting to eat a tamale without first shucking it was a clear signal to Hispanics in the United States of the insensitivity of the president to this constituency; and,

finding that rising anti-Jewish sentiment between 1998 and 2000 was met with rising pro-Jewish views perhaps reflects the success of the efforts of elites to combat anti-Semitism. Perhaps one very important difference between Russia today and the Russia of the past is that powerful and prominent political elites have publicly condemned anti-Semitism and have argued strongly in favour of intergroup tolerance.⁸⁶

We contend that a majority of Russians are predisposed to reject scurrilous allegations against Russian Jews, and that these predispositions have received important reinforcement from popular Russian political leaders. We add to this argument the contention that blaming Jews for Russia's myriad problems simply lacks plausibility and credibility for most people. Analogously, Donald Horowitz has persuasively argued that ethnic riots rarely pick scapegoats as their victims. Instead, he asserts that a certain amount of rationality characterizes the selection of victims in riots, based in part on long-standing grievances against groups. Horowitz even claims that riots involve little displacement of raw anger, in the sense that rioters refrain from attacking strong targets, displacing their venom on weaker substitutes.⁸⁷ In a similar sense, perhaps prejudice, especially in a well-educated society, cannot be moulded in every conceivable direction. Javeline draws a similar conclusion about the attribution of blame for wage arrears in Russia: finding whom to blame is not necessarily easy or even possible, but for many Russians it is likely to make more sense to blame the Communists, the *nomenklatura*, the legacy of Communism, oligarchs, the West, etc., than to blame Jews.⁸⁸ Blame attributions are pluralistic, and therefore diffused.

Or the Chechens: as we noted in the introduction to this article, that Jews are not prominent scapegoats in Russia should not be taken to mean that no scapegoats exist. In fact, the new conventional wisdom asserts that many Russians hold deep-seated prejudices towards people from the Caucasus region, and that the wars in Chechnya may well have activated and exacerbated such feelings.⁸⁹ In the end, we actually understand little about

(F'note continued)

similarly, when Nelson Mandela donned a rugby jersey in South Africa, virtually every white person in the country took notice. Subtle messages are often more effective at social persuasion than more explicit appeals to attitude change. See Shanto Iyengar and Adam F. Simon, 'New Perspective and Evidence on Political Communication and Campaign Effects', *Annual Review of Psychology*, 51 (2000), 149–69.

⁸⁶ In some respects, it matters little whether elite expressions of tolerance are sincere or not. Perhaps some Russian leaders only advocate tolerance out of a desire to win international respect and approval. We agree that sincere tolerance may be more valuable than strategic tolerance, but the value of strategic tolerance should not therefore be ignored or underestimated.

⁸⁷ Donald L. Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

⁸⁸ Javeline, *Protest and the Politics of Blame*. In a 1994 survey, White, Rose and McAllister asked a question about who is to blame for Russia's economic problems, asking about sixteen groups. A large majority of the respondents cast blame ('definitely' or 'somewhat') on the Russian government; only 8 per cent of the respondents blamed (definitely or somewhat) Jews. Based on the percentage of respondents saying the group is 'definitely' to blame, the most blameworthy factors are: the disintegration of the Soviet Union (47 per cent); the Mafia (46 per cent); the Russian government (43 per cent); and the Russian president personally (40 per cent). No other group or institution attracted as much as 40 per cent of the respondents. The least blameworthy group on the list is workers, followed by Jews. It is perhaps interesting to note that 25 per cent of the respondents did not know whether Jews should be blamed, a figure that seems high. However, 30 per cent did not know whether capitalists should be blamed; 29 per cent did not know about foreign governments; and 25 per cent did not know whether the current Russian parliament should be blamed. See Stephen White, Richard Rose and Ian McAllister, *How Russia Votes* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1997), pp. 55–6.

⁸⁹ In the 2000 survey, we asked a battery of questions about what groups the respondents disliked. We queried them on a set of groups we selected (as in Table 1, above), but also asked the respondents to identify groups not on our list that they disliked a great deal. Only a single respondent mentioned anything at all related to Chechnya

how scapegoats are selected and identified, and especially how attributions of broad societal blame get successfully attached to specific scapegoats. From the analysis in this article, we can draw no conclusions about whether Russians tend to blame their country's problems on any particular groups other than Jews.

Many caveats apply to this analysis. Obviously, our data are not capable of addressing change in Russian attitudes associated with recent developments in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.⁹⁰ Nor can our surveys examine the perceptions of Russian Jews of the views of their fellow citizens or their political leaders. We have already acknowledged that survey questions cannot yield anything more precise than broad characterizations of the extent of, and change in, anti-Jewish prejudice over the specific time period of our surveys. And even relatively small amounts of anti-Semitism, like any racism, can have vastly disproportionate consequences for a society.

But we can draw more confident conclusions about scapegoat theory, at least in so far as it applies to Jews. Our findings point to the limitations of a theory that is customarily based on studies of actual outbreaks of scapegoating, rather than on the conditions that purportedly cause them, and our data suggest the need to rethink and re-examine the theory itself. Moreover, our evidence that anti-Semitism is primarily a result of people's predispositions, rather than their perceptions of the economic or political changes in their country, points to the need to pay more attention to those individual attributes themselves, not to environmental catalysts. Anti-Jewish sentiment in Russia thus seems to be both 'irrational' in the sense of reflecting basic psychological processes of prejudices, but also 'rational' in the sense of being resistant to boundless manipulation by opportunistic elites. As a result, we conclude that future research should carefully consider not only instances in which prejudice is mobilized but also in which prejudice does *not* become pernicious. Only then can useful theorizing about the causes of intolerance and repression proceed.

(Footnote continued)

(nominating 'Caucasian nationalists'), and practically no respondents added 'terrorists' to the list. It is important to remember that this survey was conducted in 2000, well before the most recent uprising of Chechen separatists. Whether the Russian people now focus on Chechens as a scapegoat cannot be discerned from our data.

⁹⁰ In a recent report from The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, survey data were analysed on attitudes towards Jews in various countries. The data they report are based on a simple question asking whether the respondent holds a 'very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable, or very unfavourable opinion of' various groups, including Jews. Data are reported for Russia for 2004, 1992 and 1991. Collapsing responses, the percentages are: 2004, Favourable, 65 per cent, Unfavourable, 25 per cent, 'Don't know'/refused, 10 per cent; 1992, Favourable, 65 per cent, Unfavourable, 22 per cent, 'Don't know'/refused 13 per cent; 1991, Favourable, 58 per cent, Unfavourable, 24 per cent, 'Don't know'/refused 16 per cent. Thus, it appears that opinions changed little over the course of the 1990s, and that today favourable opinion towards Jews is more common than unfavourable opinion by a ratio of almost 3 to 1.

The same report shows data for a variety of countries in 2004. The percentages of respondents reporting unfavourable views towards Jews are: United States, 8 per cent; Great Britain, 9 per cent; France, 11 per cent; Germany 20 per cent; Russia, 25 per cent; Turkey, 49 per cent; Pakistan, 80 per cent and Morocco, 81 per cent. It is perhaps noteworthy that the percentage of respondents expressing favourable views towards Jews is higher in Russia (65 per cent) than it is in Germany (63 per cent). See The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, *A Year After Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists. A Nine Country Survey* [The Pew Global Attitudes Project] (Washington, D.C.: The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2004). Available at <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=206> (accessed 24 June 2005).

APPENDIX A: DETAILS OF THE PANEL SURVEY

In the first wave, face-to-face interviews were completed between 8 May and 13 June 1996, with the overwhelming majority (90 per cent) of the interviews being conducted in May (the period of the run-up to the first round of voting in the Russian presidential election). Non-institutionalized residents of Russia 16 years old and older were eligible to be interviewed. The sample is representative of the entire territory of Russia, and was drawn from thirty-eight Primary Sampling Units (PSUs). At least forty-two interviews were conducted in each PSU; no more than seventy interviews were conducted in a single PSU, except for the Moscow and St Petersburg PSUs (128 and 112 interviews, respectively).

Interviews were attempted with 2,442 respondents, with a resulting response rate of 84 per cent.⁹¹ Up to eight call-backs were used. Individual respondents were selected using the Kish selection method⁹² and consequently the data are weighted to reflect the size of the household. Local interviewers, trained by project personnel travelling from Moscow, conducted all of the interviews. The average length of the interview was 87 minutes (standard deviation = 31 minutes, median = 85 minutes), with a range from 25 to 255 minutes. As is common in surveys in Russia and elsewhere, women were slightly over-represented in the sample (58 per cent female in the sample versus 55 per cent in the population).⁹³

The second wave of the panel was fielded in April 1998, with a response rate of 82.7 per cent. No contact could be made with 13.0 per cent of the first-wave respondents, the interview could not be completed with another 0.6 per cent, and 3.7 per cent refused to be reinterviewed. By far, the most common reason for failing to complete the second interview was inability to contact the respondent (75.1 per cent), and the most common reason for this inability was that the respondent had moved to another place. Contact was made with another portion of the first-wave respondents, but the interview could not be completed for a variety of reasons (accounting for 3.4% of the non-response – e.g., the respondent was sick or drunk). In 21.6 per cent of the non-responses, the subject refused to be interviewed, usually without much explanation. Even by the most permissive coding, only ten first-wave respondents refused to be re-interviewed due to fear of political or criminal reprisals. This second-wave response rate is quite high by comparative standards.⁹⁴

The final wave of the panel survey was conducted from April to June 2000, with the vast majority of the interviews completed in May. Interviews were concluded with 1,366 respondents from the original sample of 2,059, for an overall response rate of 66.3 per cent. In 2000, only 4.6 per cent of these 2,059 respondents refused to be interviewed. The overwhelming reason for a failed interview in 2000 was the inability to locate and contact the respondent. A handful of respondents not interviewed in 1998 was included in the 2000 sample.

We have considered whether those who responded in the subsequent waves of the panel differ systematically from those who did not. We focus on one of the major variables of interest in this survey: support for democratic institutions and processes. The analysis reveals that those who did not respond in 1998 were slightly less supportive of democracy for Russia (this is no doubt due to the death of older respondents). The differences, while statistically significant, are generally trivial (for example, the means on the democratic values index are 3.35 in 1996 and 3.27 in 1998). In 2000, the difference on democratic values did not even achieve statistical significance ($p > 0.05$).

⁹¹ Of the 383 interviews not completed, about half (8.1 per cent of the total) were instances in which we were unable to make any contact with the respondent, and the other half (7.6 per cent of the total) were refusals.

⁹² Leslie Kish, *Survey Sampling* (New York: Wiley, 1965), pp. 398–401.

⁹³ Russian Federation State Committee on Statistics, *The Demographic Yearbook of the Russian Federation 1993* (Moscow: Russian Federation State Committee on Statistics, 1994), pp. 26–7.

⁹⁴ For instance, the highly influential *Political Action* Panel reported response rates ranging from 65 per cent in the Netherlands to 40 per cent in West Germany. See M. Kent Jennings, Jan W. van Deth *et al.*, *Continuities in Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three Western Democracies* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989), Table A.1, p. 376. Gibson reports analysis of Russian and Ukrainian panel data based on a response rate of 52 per cent, and Gibson and Caldeira analyse panel data with a rate of between 30 per cent and 76 per cent across the countries of the European Union. See James L. Gibson, 'Political and Economic Markets: Changes in the Connections Between Attitudes Toward Political Democracy and a Market Economy Within the Mass Culture of Russia and Ukraine', *Journal of Politics*, 58 (1996), 954–84; James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira, 'The Legal Cultures of Europe', *Law and Society Review*, 30 (March, 1996), 55–85; and James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira, 'Changes in the Legitimacy of the European Court of Justice: A Post-Maastricht Analysis', *British Journal of Political Science*, 28 (1998), 63–91.

APPENDIX B: MEASUREMENT

Alienation, Anomie

This scale was also derived from Cloninger's inventory of personality characteristics.

- 'The only thing you can be sure of today is that you can be sure of nothing.'
- 'It seems to me that it is very difficult to find anything to be optimistic about today.'
- 'These days I often can't decide what rules I should follow.'
- 'Nowadays there is less reliability in relations between people.'

The reliabilities of the items in 1996, 1998 and 2000, are: 0.80, 0.76, and 0.71, respectively. According to the factor analysis results, each set of items within each survey is unidimensional.

Economic Marginality

- 'It seems to me that I have few of the qualities that are valued in today's economic situation.'
- 'There is no place for me in today's economic situation.'

Within the three surveys, the bivariate correlations between the responses to these two items are: 0.64, 0.70, and 0.67, respectively.

Dogmatism

Closedmindedness was measured as the average response (on a five-point Likert response set) to the following items:

- 'There are two kinds of people in the world: good and bad.'
- 'A group can't exist for long if it puts up with too many different opinions of its members.'
- 'Out of all the different religions that exist in the world, there is probably only one true one.'
- 'To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.'

The reliabilities of the four-item sets in 1996, 1998 and 2000, are: 0.45, 0.46, and 0.48, respectively. According to the factor analysis results, each set of items within each survey is unidimensional.

Social Conventionalism: Acceptance of the Status Quo

- 'People should try to adjust to the traditions of society, and not fight with them.'
- 'It is better to get used to the shortcomings of the present political power, because it is too dangerous to try to change it.'
- 'People shouldn't try to change the structure of the society, but should accept it as it is.'

The reliabilities of the items in 1996, 1998 and 2000, are: 0.49, 0.52 and 0.50, respectively. According to the factor analysis results, each set of items within each survey is unidimensional.

Xenophobia

Xenophobia, a distaste for that which is different, is measured by three statements (with responses collected on a five-point response set ranging from 'describes me exactly' to 'doesn't describe me at all') from Cloninger's TPQ measure of personality (Acceptance versus Social Intolerance subscale).

- 'I think that listening to opinions that are different from my own is simply a waste of time.'
- 'Usually I don't like people whose views are different from mine.'
- 'Usually I accept people as they are, even if they aren't like me at all.'

The reliabilities of the items in 1996, 1998 and 2000, are: 0.53, 0.56, and 0.66, respectively. According to the factor analysis results, each set of items within each survey is unidimensional.

APPENDIX C: UNCERTAINTY IN EXPRESSED ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS

As the data in Table 3 (above) make plain, a sizeable portion of our respondents refuses to express an opinion one way or another towards Jews. This is a common finding in studies of anti-Semitism in the United States and elsewhere, but it is nonetheless worrisome since uncertainty may be a safe harbour for those who are anti-Semitic but embarrassed to admit it to a stranger (the interviewer). We therefore conducted extensive additional analyses of such responses in the panel dataset.

We first note, however, that if social norms discouraged the open expression of anti-Semitism in Russia in the 1990s, then this by itself is a rather dramatic break with Russian history. At some points in the Russian past, openly expressing anti-Jewish sentiment was not only *not* discouraged but it was actually quite acceptable. One should not discount the power of social norms if in fact they delegitimize anti-Semitism in contemporary Russia.

Our various analyses of the 'Don't know' issue in responses to questions about Jews leads us to conclude that, while some holding anti-Jewish views surely disguise them with uncertainty, the tendency is probably not widespread. We base this conclusion on the following evidence.

- (1) First, it should be noted that our general approach to survey questions is to legitimize giving 'Don't know' or uncertain answers. For instance, on items with a Likert response set, we use a 'show card' with the possible responses listed, and 'Uncertain' is an explicit opinion offered the respondent. We have adopted this strategy because many of the issues about which we query Russians are perhaps novel to them and we find little utility in getting people to express a substantive position that they are fabricating on the spot. Consequently, our survey items often generate quite sizeable percentages of uncertain responses.
- (2) Survey items in Russia always generate a sizeable percentage of uncertain responses. For instance, in a survey reported by Boeva and Shironin, 46 per cent of Russians found it 'hard to say' whether they had positive or negative feelings towards 'Marxism-Leninism' and (in a separate question) 'Capitalism'.⁹⁵ In the most comprehensive analysis to date of 'Don't know' responses in Russian survey data, Carnaghan concludes that 'for most Russians, most of the time, if they did not answer questions it was because they had little interest and minimal information: they did not have an opinion.' Furthermore, to the extent that exceptions to this general finding exist, the alternative explanation of uncertain responses is ambivalence, not self-censorship.⁹⁶
- (3) Indeed, more direct evidence on this matter is available from the 2000 survey. In order to investigate the hypothesis that giving uncertain responses to the anti-Semitism items is related to a generalized propensity to give 'Don't know' or uncertain responses to items based on a Likert response set, we calculated a variable indicating how many uncertain responses were given to the seventy-five statements in the interview using a Likert response set (excluding, of course, the four anti-Semitism statements). These items represent a wide variety of social, economic, political and psychological issues. Across the seventy-five statements, we observe a mean of 15 per cent uncertain replies (median = 13, standard deviation = 11). More important, a strong relationship can be found between this general propensity to give uncertain responses and giving uncertain responses to the four anti-Semitism propositions: $r = 0.52$. Many Russians who tell us they don't know their views towards Jews also tell us they don't know their views towards a variety of social, economic, political and psychological issues.

The four anti-Semitism items have an average of 32.6 per cent uncertain replies, a figure decidedly higher than the average. But consider the following comparisons:

- 41.9 per cent don't know whether Jews will choose money over people, but 43.6 per cent are uncertain about the following statement: 'To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.'
- 32.4 per cent don't know whether Jews should be punished for killing Christ, but 33.5 per cent are uncertain about: 'Political reforms in our country are moving too rapidly.'
- 29.4 per cent don't know whether it would be better for Jews to leave Russia, but the same percentage is uncertain about: 'Freedom of speech should be given to all political groups, even if some of their remarks are dangerous or offensive to other groups in society.'

⁹⁵ Irina Boeva and Viacheslav Shironin, *Russians between State and Market: The Generations Compared* (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, Studies in Public Policy No. 205, 1992).

⁹⁶ Ellen Carnaghan, 'Alienation, Apathy, or Ambivalence? "Don't Knows" and Democracy in Russia', *Slavic Review*, 55 (1996), 325-63, pp. 361-2.

—27.2 per cent don't know if Jews are responsible for Russia's problems, but 27.2 per cent give uncertain replies to the statement that: 'Political parties often create conflicts that really don't exist.'⁹⁷

Thus, complicated questions often generate considerable uncertainty among Russian respondents.

- (4) One of our statements, however, is not very complicated. 'Jews deserve to be punished because they killed Christ.' It is easy for us to imagine that one might not know how to respond to the proposition that Russia would be better off without any Jews, but the statement that Jews ought to be punished for having killed Christ is much less ambiguous. It is legitimate to suspect, therefore, that many of those giving a 'Don't know' response to this item in particular are in fact people who agree with the statement but who are reticent about expressing their true views.

Do respondents who express uncertainty about whether Jews should be punished also express uncertainty to the other items in the set of anti-Jewish prejudice statements? We examined the responses to the other items among those who said they were uncertain whether Jews should be punished for killing Christ. Among the 441 Russians claiming to be uncertain about this statement, 20.4 per cent gave uncertain responses to the other three items, while 21.5 per cent gave substantive responses to the entire set. Only 10.7 per cent of these respondents rejected the view that Jews will chose money over people, but 44.7 per cent disagreed that Jews are responsible for Russia's problems. Thus, we conclude that at least some of those (about half) are uncertain about the punishment question but nonetheless capable of giving 'not anti-Semitic' responses to other statements in the group.

- (5) This raises the question more generally about the degree of correlation between giving 'Don't know' responses to the anti-Semitism items. In fact, the tendency to give uncertain responses across the four anti-Semitism items is not particularly strong. The correlations between four dummy variables indicating an uncertain reply for each of the anti-Semitism items average only 0.24, indicating no strong tendency for those giving uncertain replies to one statement to give uncertain replies to the other items.
- (6) What are the predictors of the tendency to give uncertain replies to the four anti-Semitism items? We regressed an index of uncertainty across the anti-Semitism set on (a) a seven-item index of political knowledge, (b) self-declared interest in politics, (c) self-declared awareness of the State Duma and Constitutional Court, (d) the measure of affect towards Jews, and (e) the propensity to give uncertain responses to the seventy-five Likert-response items. Of course, this last variable is so strongly related to uncertainty on anti-Jewish prejudice that we conducted this analysis using hierarchical regression.

The bivariate correlation between affect and uncertainty is 0.09. Those expressing more negative affect towards Jews are indeed more likely to express uncertainty, although the relationship is quite weak.⁹⁸ When all other variables are added to the equation, the standardized regression coefficient for affect falls to 0.06, which is statistically significant at $p = 0.023$. Thus, the relationship is trivial. Since this may in some sense 'over-control' for uncertainty, we consider the equation without the uncertainty propensity, but with the controls for knowledge and awareness. In this equation, the effect of affect on uncertainty is also trivial: $\beta = 0.07$, $p = 0.007$. An increase in a single uncertain response requires a change of roughly three units on the 11-point affect scale. We conclude from this analysis that those who give uncertain replies to our anti-Semitic statements do so out of lack of interest and information more than from an effort to disguise their anti-Jewish prejudices.

⁹⁷ In every instance, the comparison item was selected as the item in which the next highest percentage of respondents was uncertain. A table showing each item and the percentage of uncertain responses is available from the authors.

⁹⁸ The equation is $\text{Uncertainty} = 1.05 + 0.48 \times \text{Affect}$. This equation indicates that it takes a change of roughly two units on the 11-point affect scale to produce a single additional uncertain response.